

# SOUTHWESTERN POLITICAL AND SOCIAL SCIENCE QUARTERLY

Vol. VII

JUNE, 1926

#### Board of Editors

CALEB PERRY PATTERSON GROBGE WARD STOCKING

MAX SYLVIUS HANDMAN

					Page
THE P	ATROLOGY OF PRO			W. J. 30	1
THE T	INDENGY AWAY FO	et Positions.	DEMOCRACY	IN THE UN	
ST	ATES		B. I	7. Wright,	Jr. 16
THE M	EXICAN INMIGRATE	in Timas -	- Mar Sy	lvine Hand	man   35
THE R	AILROAD PROBLEM OF	THE UNITED	Status - 8	lampel O. S	
Раусно	LOGICAL TECHNIQUE		Pacetacts -	Martin W	
MANAG	CURRENCIES			M. R. Gre	
Book 1	REVIEWS		dilted by B.	F. Wright,	Jr. 81

THE SOUTHWEST

"Entered as second-cine.
Austin, Tene

## The Southwestern Political and Social Science Association

PRESIDENT

J. G. WILLACY, San Antonio, Texas

FIRST VICE-PRESIDENT
GEORGE B. DEALEY, Dallas, Texas

SECOND VICE-PRESIDENT
D. Y. THOMAS, Fayetteville, Arkansas

THIRD VICE-PRESIDENT
WALTER THOMPSON, Norman, Oklahoma

SECRETARY-TREASURER CAMPBELL B. BEARD, Austin, Texas

#### EXECUTIVE COUNCIL

PRESIDENT, J. G. WILLACY, San Antonio, Texas
EX-PRESIDENT, W. B. BIZZELL, Norman, Oklahoma
EX-PRESIDENT, W. M. W. SPLAWN, Austin, Texas
EX-PRESIDENT A. P. WOOLDRIDGE, Austin, Texas
EX-PRESIDENT GEORGE VAUGHAN, Little Rock, Arkansas
EX-PRESIDENT H. G. JAMES, Lincoln, Nebraska
VICE-PRESIDENT GEORGE B. DEALEY, Dallas, Texas
VICE-PRESIDENT D. Y. THOMAS, Fayetteville, Arkansas
VICE-PRESIDENT, WALTER THOMPSON, Norman, Oklahoma
THE BOARD OF EDITORS

SECRETARY-TREASURER, Campbell B. Beard, Austin, Texas

CHAS. W. PIPKIN, Baton Rouge, Louisiana
W. F. HAUHART, Dallas, Texas.

THE SOUTHWESTERN POLITICAL AND SOCIAL SCIENCE QUARTERLY is supplied to all members of the Southwestern Political and Social Science Association. The subscription price of the QUARTERLY is two dollars a year. Applications for membership, orders for the QUARTERLY and remittances should be addressed to Charles A. Timm, Secretary-Treasurer of the Association, University Station, Austin, Texas.

Correspondence with reference to contributions to the QUARTERLY should be addressed to the Editor, University Station, Austin, Texas.

### THE SOUTHWESTERN POLITICAL AND SOCIAL SCIENCE QUARTERLY

The editors disclaim responsibility for views expressed by contributors to The Quarterly

Vol. VII

JUNE, 1926

No. 1

#### THE PATHOLOGY OF PROGRESS\*

W. B. BIZZELL
President of the University of Oklahoma

The subject of my remarks this evening appears as one of the chapter headings in a little book entitled *Economic Utiliza*tion of History, written some years ago by Henry W. Farnam of Yale. The topic is so suggestive that I feel justified in its use in making a brief application to existing conditions in our social life today.

Perhaps before entering upon a discussion of such a topic a word should be said in justification of the phraseology of my subject. The sociologist has been compelled to utilize the technical phraseology of the older sciences. Slowly through the last half century the literature of sociology has developed a phraseology more or less its own, but even today students of this newest of the social sciences have been compelled to use phrases that are indigenous to other fields of learning.

The close relationship between biology and sociology has been responsible for the tendency of the latter science to draw rather largely on the former for its nomenclature. This relationship has also been responsible for the organic conception of the state which was a popular notion among German political theorists a generation ago. The use of analogies between the natural and social sciences has also been largely responsible for the introduction of many words technically belonging to biology to explain social phenomena. This tend-

<sup>\*</sup>Presidential address delivered to the Southwestern Political and Social Science Association at Dallas on Thursday evening, April 1 at McFarlin Memorial Auditorium at the Southern Methodist University.

ency is well illustrated by the practice of the social reformer who attempts to translate the evils of our society into the diseases of society, and from that it is but a step to the use of the phrase "social pathology" for the general subject of an investigation into the evils that follow in the wake of social progress. Professor Samuel George Smith defines "social pathology" as a study of social defeats, and develops the biological and sociological analysis as follows:

"The diseases of society, like the diseases of the human body, are to be studied that remedies may be found for them where they exist, but most of all, that by a larger vitality and a greater practical wisdom, the number of diseases may be reduced to the lowest terms, and we may set ourselves to social tasks with the ideal of finally conquering them all together."

The phrase "social pathology" has been in use for several years but the recent books of Smith, Farnam, and that of Warbasee on medical sociology have given this phrase respectability in the vocabulary of the social reformer. We may, therefore, assume that there is a science of pathology in social life as well as in the realm of biology.

#### PHILOSOPHICAL ATTITUDE TOWARD PROGRESS

But, is there such a thing as the pathology of progress? This question requires a further word of explanation. Progress is a term that is difficult to define. Several questions arise with reference to this word. What is progress? What is the evidence of its reality? Is unlimited human progress an accepted category of the social sciences? Is progress natural or artificial or both? These questions present great difficulties but most of us believe that human progress is a reality and that the old debatable question "Resolved, That the world is growing better and not worse" offers more argument on the affirmative than on the negative side of the question.

The attitude of thinkers toward progress has created three philosophies of life: viz., the philosophy of pessimism, the philosophy of meliorism, and the philosophy of optimism. Schopenhauer in his "Studies in Pessimism" raises the question, "Does the pleasure in this world outweigh the pain?" His investigation led to his defense of suicide and his astonishing

discussion of the "Vanity of Existence." This famous philosopher is by no means the last or the only advocate of this doctrine. Alfred Russel Wallace reaffirms the doctrine of pessimism in his book on Social Environment and Modern Progress. In this, the last book written by this distinguished English scientist before his death, he attempts to sustain the thesis that we can produce no evidence to support the doctrine of modern progress. After contrasting social conditions of recent times with the social situation of the past, he reaches the following remarkable conclusion:

"Taking account of these various groups of undoubted facts, many of which are so gross, so terrible, that they cannot be overstated, it is not too much to say that our whole social system of society is rotten from top to bottom, and the social environment as a whole, in relation to our claims, is the worst that the world has ever seen."

If the philosophy of pessimism should become the predominant philosophy of life, there would be no justification for such a discussion as the one I am entering upon, for there would be no advantage in revealing the nature or cause of social disorders because there would be no hope of overcoming them by methods of social control and human direction.

But, in contrast with these views we have George Eliot's philosophy of meliorism and the philosophy of optimism as taught by Newell Dwight Hillis, Henry Churchill King, Finot in his Science of Happiness, and in the writings of numerous other men and women of the present day. John Fiske, the greatest American interpreter of Darwin and Wallace, takes issue with the latter in his answer to the question, "In the cruel strife of centuries has it not often seemed as if the earth were to be rather the prize of the hardest heart and strongest fist?" His answer is one of the most eloquent passages in English scientific literature. "The future," says Fiske, "is lighted for us with the radiant colors of hope. Strife and sorrow shall disappear. Peace and love shall reign supreme. The dream of poets, the lesson of priests and prophets, the inspiration of the great musicians is confirmed in the light of modern knowledge; and as we gird ourselves up for the work of life we may look forward to the time when, in the truest sense, the kingdoms of this world shall become the kingdom of Christ, and He shall reign forever and ever, King of Kings and Lord of Lords."

For the purpose of this discussion the definition of social progress as given by Professor Sims in his Society and Surplus, will suffice. "Social progress," says Sims, "may then be defined as an accumulation of social surplus together with such equitable distribution of the same as will best further continual accumulation and promote a sufficient degree of harmony to guarantee evolutionary rather than revolutionary change."

Civilization and human progress are often used as synonymous terms. In fact, civilization has been defined as "human progress integrated and intensified." Todd in his *Theories of Social Progress* comments on this definition as follows: "The most essential and characteristic manifestations of civilization are diffusion of culture, a high moral and intellectual level and respect for law."

#### THE CHARACTERISTICS OF PROGRESS

The idea that progress has no limitations is of comparatively recent origin. Professor Parker of Harvard in his Biology and Social Problems says that, "The idea of unlimited progress is but four centuries old. The idea of the conscious direction of that progress is yet in its infancy. Few, indeed, there are who do not still consider human characteristics, institutions, and environments to be as immutably fixed as the hills and the oceans. The merest scatterings of human beings realize that with knowledge and coöperative effort large masses of people can, in a general measure, seize their destiny and mold it to their conscience aims. With the birth of this idea of social control, among the few, have come large plans of social reorganization to affect the many."

In this passage, we come face to face with two of the most important tendencies of modern life, namely, the growing faith in the possibility of unlimited human progress; and secondly, the possibility of the conscious direction of human welfare. The largest contribution to both of these conceptions must be credited to Lester F. Ward. He believed in the possibility of human progress and defined it as "that which secures the increase of human happiness." Ward knew the objections

that would be raised to this definition and he met the issue squarely. His answer contains a germ idea of the pathology of progress, for he recognized that the agencies created to promote happiness often yield a sorry by-product which tends to retard progressive civilization. "It cannot be denied," says Ward, "that civilization, by the many false practices which it has introduced, by the facilities which its very complexity affords to the concealment of crime, and by the monstrous systems of corruption which fashion, caste and conventionality are enabled to shelter, is the direct means of rendering many individuals miserable in the extreme; but these are the necessary incidents to its struggle to advance under the dominion of natural forces alone."

Professor Farnam has in mind the same idea as that expressed by Ward when he says: "Almost every new invention, almost every new process, creates a power which is susceptible to abuse, or leads to changes in conditions which may be injurious to certain cases or certain interests."

#### BY-PRODUCTS OF CIVILIZATION

Dr. Wilbur F. Crafts, writing sometime before the World War, said that, "There are thirteen evils that are increasing with alarming rapidity. They are: Murder, divorce, lynching, labor riots, municipal corruption, yellow journalism, brutal sports, judicial maladministration, general lawlessness, the consumption of intoxicating liquors, Sabbath desecration, impure shows and graft." At that time the United States was leading the world in most of these evils. It is interesting to study the change that has come in recent years with regard to some of these social offenses. Lynching has declined, labor riots have not been so frequent in recent years, the consumption of intoxicating liquors has been greatly reduced as the result of prohibition, and the forms of some of the other evils mentioned by Crafts have been greatly changed.

The most astonishing by-product of our civilization today is the enormous increase in crime. Lawrence Veiller, writing in the World's Work for December, declares that, "America is the most lawless nation on earth." He asserts that "the homicidal rate of the United States is double that of Italy, four times that of Australia and South Africa, and nine times

that of Scotland." It is claimed, on high authority, that the crime cost exceeds \$10,000,000,000 annually. The crimes against property indicate a nation-wide disregard for the rights of private property. Theft, burglary, fraudulent bankruptcy and embezzlement have increased enormously since the World War. "Penologists and criminologists estimate," says an authority on the subject, "that in one sense or another, from 1 to 11/2 per cent of the population are criminals. At all times about 200,000 persons in the United States are under lock and key. But these 200,000 represent less than one-fifth of the active criminal population—men, women, and children who are definitely anti-social and certain to be charges of the state for some part of their lives. Not only does this great army of offenders steal \$3,500,000,000 annually; not only does it require about as much more public money for policing, imprisonment, feeding and attention; but it is an unproductive force, a great economic waste. If the annual productiveness of the individual be estimated at the conservative sum of \$1,500, it will be seen that \$1,500,000,000 must be set down on the crime bill as industrial wastage. Still other items remain to bring the total up to the estimated \$10,000,000,000 to which reference was made. These include the operations of criminals, not of the stealing classification, such as slayers, fire-setters, smugglers, bootleggers, counterfeiters and many others; the sum spent on investigations and prosecutions; the net loss through commercial bribery and many other stray headings."

#### ECONOMIC INDEPENDENCE OF WOMEN AND DIVORCE

We would certainly credit to progress the increasing economic and political independence of women. There is no more striking example of social advancement than the great increase in the number of vocations that are now open to women and the equality of opportunity that has been vouch-safed to the women of the country through the statutory changes that have been made in the English common law with reference to woman's property rights.

But with it has come an enormous increase in divorce and the general loosening of family ties. In 1905, only 68,000 divorces were granted in the United States. In 1925, 165,000 divorces were granted, or one divorce to every 7.5 marriages.

"The rate of divorce," according to Professor Ellwood, "varies greatly in the several states. For example, in 1922, Oregon had one divorce to every 2.5 marriages; Montana had one divorce to every 4.3 marriages; Missouri had one divorce to every 4.7 marriages; Oklahoma had one divorce to every 4.8 marriages; Texas had one divorce to every 4.9 marriages; and California had one divorce to every 5.1 marriages."

In comparison with other countries we are told that in France there is one divorce to every twenty-one marriages; in Denmark there is one divorce to every twenty-two marriages; in Germany there is one divorce to every twenty-four marriages; in Norway there is one divorce to every thirty marriages; in Sweden there is one divorce to every thirty-three marriages; in Great Britain there is one divorce to every ninety-six marriages; in Canada there is one divorce to every 161 marriages; while in America there is one divorce to every eight marriages.

"These statistical facts," says Ellwood, "are cited only as a symptom of the condition of our American family life. Can we speak of the dominance of the Christian home in American society when America has more divorces in a single year, in proportion to its population, than has such a pagan country as Japan, and more than all the rest of the civilized nations put together?"

These figures show that there is something radically wrong with our home and family life. I think divorce is only a symptom and not a cause, nor is it, perhaps, the greatest evil characteristic of our family life. We cannot safely conclude, however, that the American home and home life are becoming more Christian when divorce is increasing among us four or five times as fast as our population. It is surely time that the church turn its attention to American home life.

#### DISEASE AS A PRODUCT OF CIVILIZATION

Science has made many conquests over disease and contributed to the prolongation of life. According to Dr. Louis I. Dublin, statistician of the Mentropolitan Life Insurance Company, "Eighteen years has been added to the life span of the average person in the United States since 1855."

The average duration of life has increased in this interim

from forty to fifty-eight years. The promise of life's duration in America is now twice that of British India and some of the other countries of the world.

Great progress has been made, not only in the discovery of methods of treatment, but in the prevention of diseases. Health education has made remarkable progress in most of the advanced countries of the world. In the United States there are about 10,000 persons engaged in public health work under federal, state, municipal or county auspices. In all parts of the world there is a corresponding demand for men and women competent to perform the duties of public health officials or sanitary engineers. Increasing attention is being given to vital statistics and through international agreement these statistics are becoming more nearly uniform throughout the world. But we are reminded by Albert Edward Wiggam: "That microbial diseases are chiefly the by-products of our civilization; that these microbial diseases are apparently decreasing, while at the same time man's incapacity to resist them is probably increasing; that the great physiological diseases of man's body-heart disease, Bright's disease, diabetes, cancer, degenerative diseases of the arteries, liver and central organs—are increasing; that the functional neurosis, the diseases that affect man's mind and behavior-neurasthenia, hysteria, epilepsy, insanity and the multiform of minor mental and nervous derangements of function—are probably all increasing."

It is frequently declared that insanity is essentially a disease of civilization. Professor S. G. Smith in his Social Pathology says: "There are two great causes for insanity, the one is heredity and the other is stress." To what degree is civilization responsible for the one or the other? We know that modern life is multiplying its demands upon the individual. There is little opportunity for repose. The tendency of each of us is to do more than can be done without strain. Neurasthenia is the price we are paying for the privilege. President King of Oberlin College says in his Rational Living: "We have assumed too many duties that were not duties for us, and are attempting too many things at a time. The burden is never off; the strain never remitted."

This situation presents a strange anomaly We have unconsciously increased the acceleration of the wheels of civilization until the operators, many of them, have broken down under the strain. One of the very remarkable books setting forth this idea is that of Miss Goldmark on Fatigue and Efficiency. Chapter 3 is on "The New Strain in Industry." Here we have a discussion of the mental effects of speed and complexity, monotony, piece-work, and overtime work in the machine trades.

#### SPEED AND PROGRESS

The problem of mental strain suggests the influence of the American characteristic love for speed upon life and its security. The automobile has brought many blessings to mankind, but it is also presenting some of the most serious economic and social problems that have ever confronted any civilization. The increasing number of accidents due to automobiles has become a matter of national consideration. The seriousness of this situation is indicated by the number of accidents due to automobiles as follows:

7,525 in 1918; 7,968 in 1919; 9,103 in 1920; 10,168 in 1921; 11,666 in 1922; 14,441 in 1923; 19,000 in 1924 and 45,000 injured; 24,000 in 1925 and 60,000 injured.

When we recall that there were approximately 50,000 Americans killed in the World War, and that automobile accidents are responsible for half of this number each year we get some conception of the seriousness of this problem. The causes of automobile accidents may be classified roughly as follows:

- Mental—slow mentality, absent-mindedness, and thoughtlessness.
- Mechanical—inexperienced drivers and ignorance of mechanical laws.
- 3. Moral—recklessness, irresponsibility and drunkenness.

"We should take stock of ourselves," says a thoughtful student of this problem, "to determine whether or not in these times of peace, without the incentive of flag waving and patriotic fervor, we are giving our utmost to whatever form of service falls within our opportunity to render. Has a community within its power to stamp out the evils of accidents? There must be created an atmosphere of carefulness which will pervade every home, every office, every factory, every school and every church. The public conscience must be awakened and kept aroused to the importance of the thing. Safety must be recognized as a most important asset of civic virtue. There is no alternative if we are to emancipate ourselves as a nation, as a city, and as individuals from the curse of accidents that are preventable."

#### THE SPIRIT OF LAWLESSNESS

With the increase in the number of laws for the protection of life and property has come a general spirit of lawlessness of serious proportions. Law enforcement is greatly influenced by public opinion. There is a widespread tendency throughout the country to support the laws in which we believe and to disregard those that are based upon policies not in accord with our beliefs. We find that the enforcement of the prohibition law varies by wide limitations in various sections of the country. It is generally known that in those sections where there is an overwhelming sentiment against prohibition, for example, there is great difficulty in the enforcement of the law. A number of states have passed laws requiring automobile drivers to stop their cars at railroad crossings. Reports indicate that there is little observance of these laws.

The effect of this general attitude, upon the part of the public toward the observance of laws, presents a very serious problem. Unless the public can be brought to appreciate the importance of universal respect for law, irrespective of personal opinion, the very foundations of our institutions will be rapidly undermined.

#### PARADOXES OF PROGRESS

The general situation which I have attempted to describe, briefly, presents several paradoxes as follows:

- 1. The evolution of domestic architecture is one of the remarkable achievements of recent times. But contemporaneously with it has come an increase in divorce and the loosening of family ties.
- 2. The accumulation of productive wealth in this generation is the most important economic fact of human history. The free play of the acquisitive instinct supported by our traditional ideals of private property has made this possible. But contemporaneously with this advancement in material resources has come a nation-wide onslaught by the criminal classes against private property that is without parallel in the annals of American history.
- 3. Scientific discovery has made many inroads on disease. But the by-product of the civilization that scientific discovery has produced has many new mental and microbial diseases which have baffled the scientist and which now threatens to undermine the physical and mental energies that have made a progressive civilization possible.
- 4. An increasing number of laws have been passed to increase the security of property and the protection of human life. But contemporaneously there has been an increasing disrespect for the observance of law and a corresponding insecurity of life and property.

#### CONCLUSION

The fundamental problem of an increasingly complex civilization is that of safeguarding the blessings and minimizing the perils of the social order. "We actually find," says Professor Todd, "that progress is never unilinear but zig zag; not along one straight road as the crow flies, but by a net work of criss-croosing paths . . . . Neither can we assume that scientific progress is tantamount to social progress, for the same science that lightens toil releases leisure, accumulates masses of capital and a spendable wealth, may, and frequently does, bring about social decadence and disintegration instead of progress."

There is much concrete evidence to support the doctrine that progress does not follow a straight path and that scientific progress is not synonymous with social progress. We need

but to recall some of the by-products of the industrial revolution and the new phrases that came into general use as a result of our industrial system to realize this truth. We have heard a great deal about "industrial hygiene", "occupational disease", "parasitic trades", "sweat shops", "the leisure class", and similar terms. These phrases bring up a flood of memories with reference to some of the sorry by-products that resulted from the mechanical and industrial revolution.

The creation of the state and the establishment of stable government have always been regarded as evidences of prog-The best measure of a nation's progress is by the number of laws which are obeyed and respected. Still Spencer in his Social Statics points out that, "The dangers of law are proverbial. The name of its officers are used as synonyms for trickery and greediness." Spencer also says elsewhere in discussing "The Sins of Legislators" that, "Government is begotten of aggression and by aggression." Oppenheimer, who has given us the first real sociological study of the state, says: "Every state in history was or is a State of Classes." "Government makes possible the substitution of the law of control for the law of conquest. But in the process of substitution there is always the danger of the loss of physical strength and courage. The doctrine of laissez faire was an attractive doctrine to the eighteenth century economist. The distribution of wealth by the process of free bargaining among producers, and the privilege of free contractual rights between landlord and tenant, between the borrower and lender, between employer and employee, seems to be in every way desirable. But the theorist has failed here to take account of the unscrupulous trickster, and the dishonest employer. The wholesome process of contractual freedom has been accompanied with peonage and slavery, monopoly and 'watered stocks', and a host of other evils that compelled the economist to retract his theory, and the legislator to deny even the principle."

The problem ahead of us is to foresee the sorry by-products that follow in the wake of the blessings of science and invention and create agencies for their elimination or control. We certainly should profit by the experiences of the past as we face the problems of the future. A highly conscious society should not assume a fatalistic attitude toward the forces of civilization. Is it not apparent to us today that if we had

profited by the experiences of the past we could have prevented many of the perils that have come upon us as a result of the invention of the steam engine and the automobile. We have not yet experienced the full effects of the sorry by-products of the flying machine and the radio. But it must be obvious that some of the most serious problems of human history will result from these new instruments of civilization. It would be a tragedy should we stupidly wait until these evils arise before we attempt to cope with them.

It is not contended that it is possible to completely eliminate all the ills that afflict our society. There is nothing to indicate that we are approaching the social millennium, but it is not too much to expect a highly conscious society to take account of its past mistakes and redirect its endeavors in the interest of a more harmonious and satisfying social life. It is this point of view in social philosophy to which I have attempted to direct your attention this evening.

## THE TENDENCY AWAY FROM POLITICAL DEMOCRACY IN THE UNITED STATES\*

B. F. WRIGHT, JR.
University of Texas

This paper is concerned not with defections from democracy as defined by Rousseau or Bentham or Marx or the Webbs, but with the extent to which traditional and generally accepted doctrines of popular government have and are being departed from in the country in which they were developed. It is readily admitted that the history of our institutions goes back thousands of years before the Declaration of Independence and that many of the most cherished American ideas concerning rights and liberties were borrowed from earlier English and French writers, but, since the problem here is not the ultimate origins of such institutions and ideals, we may simply acknowledge the importance of the sources and pass on to the distinctively American development. By way of introduction it seems desirable to insert here a summary of that process of growth in order properly to set the stage for a consideration of some recent tendencies.

Without entirely agreeing with Professor Turner that "American democracy is fundamentally the outcome of the experiences of the American people in dealing with the West" it is not at all difficult to agree that democracy did not come to America in the Susan Constant or the Mayflower. When the colonists did not come to secure economic gains for themselves or their principles, they came to get certain pretty definite privileges or rights for themselves and the small group to which they belonged. Not freedom of religion for all but freedom for their own sect was the guiding principle of all the colonies settled from religious motives, Providence plantations, Maryland and Pennsylvania excepted-and the two latter were proprietary not popularly governed colonies. fondness of the colonists for "equal rights for all" is seen in their institutions of slavery, indentured servitude and a suffrage extending to but a fraction of the free white males.

<sup>\*</sup>Paper read at the seventh annual meeting of the Southwestern Political and Social Science Association.

If, then, there was little of democracy (again using the term in the sense which it later came to have in America) in the colonies, how did it come to this country, and why? Without attempting completely to solve so involved a problem this much at least may be safely premised: democracy came not because it must inevitably result from the nature of the American people but because certain additional liberties and privileges were, from time to time, desired, struggled for, even fought for, and, too, were desired by increasingly large numbers of people. In such conditions democratic arguments surely appear, for they are the only ones which satisfy the rationalizing need. Thus it was in the period just preceding the Revolution and during the first three or four years of that revolt that democratic ideas got their first great impetus. Men who in 1763 seem never to have given the notion of liberty and the rights of man a passing thought became ardent orators and pamphleteers in defense of those sacred ideals when the Revenue and Stamp Acts were passed. Lincoln may have been philosophically correct when he held that the fathers did not mean merely that Americans are equal to Englishmen by their "all men are created equal" phrase, but historically that view was the basis of their theory. Equality was not an end so much as a means to the growing end-independence; first, independence from certain sorts of regulation, then independence from all regulation by Parliament, and finally, independence from Britain. Of course, after the struggle got well under way the democratic ideals were transplanted to the realm of domestic politics, but they did not originate therenot in this country at least. Moreover, such theories were not destined to enjoy uninterrupted acceptance. The national constitutional system, and the state systems, excepting the earliest ones, were worked out in a period of different needs and sympathies. The drafting of the National Constitution came shortly after the period of revolution, of appeal to the inherent natural rights of man, of insistence upon a maximum of liberty, and of fear of governments; a period of depreciated currency, of debt repudiation, of commercial jealousy and warfare, of discontent and of agrarian rebellion. In a legal sense the Constitution was the product of a revolution against the existing Articles of Confederation and from the point of view of political institutions it was a document of reaction. Framed by a

convention of the wealthy, landed, commercial class, it represented the ideas of those who suffered from the previous excess of libertarianism and who were consequently more desirous of securing strong, workable government than of placing restrictions upon it in behalf of popuar rights and powers. Not direct rule by the people, or rather by the voting class, which was still a restricted one, but a system of checks and balances was the characteristic doctrine of the time. The relatively conservative theories of the members of the convention were certainly not less liberal than those held by the governing group during the next twelve years, and I think that it may be said that this period marks the close of one cycle of democratic theory in the United States. The pendulum which swung so emphatically in the direction of popular rights and democratic control during the Revolution had been directed back toward strong, efficient government.

But this was not the final cycle or "swing" of democracy in America. If the Constitution was written and put into effect in a time of comparatively little sympathy with democracy, the interpretation of it which came to be generally accepted was worked out in a period of democratic theory and, to an increasing extent, democratic practice. Jefferson, when compared with some later theorists, was not an extreme democrat. In many ways he was nearer to the views of the Federalists; like Hamilton and Adams he favored government by the best, but he differs from them in one very significant respect: he had far greater faith than they in the ability and willingness of the average men to select such leaders. Hence the appropriateness of Professor Turner's designation of him as the John the Baptist of democracy. Its Moses was, in this case, to come later-with the defeat of the last of the old line of statesmen and the election of a typical westerner (in his ideas, not his ability) to the presidency. The old line, said Henry Adams, had guided rather than been guided by public Andrew Jackson proclaimed the ideal of government not merely for but by the people. The widening of the suffrage was carried on rapidly and an increasing emphasis was placed upon the right of the average man to control his government. Jackson's declaration that government is, or at least could and should be made, sufficiently simple for all to share

in the offices of government is merely the result of this development; and its significance lies not in his statement of the theory but in its general acceptance. The result of this theory was what has commonly been called the spoils system—short terms and rotation in office—for no other method could make possible the sort of government idealized by the men of the period.

This democratic movement, begun by Jefferson and carried farther by the group of whom Jackson is the outstanding representative, culminated in the agitation against slavery—the insistence upon a literal interpretation of the equality and natural rights theories of the Declaration of Independence, its application to black as well as to white, the consequent war for Southern independence and the passage of the Reconstruction Amendments to the Constitution. The accepted political dogma of the time is probably best and certainly most concisely expressed in Lincoln's Gettysburg Address. There we find the worship of democracy carried to mystic heights in the famous phrase "government of the people, by the people and for the people." Whatever else this may mean, it is at least and emphatically a doctrine of popular self-government.

Since the Civil War there have been important discussions over finance, the tariff, the direct election of senators, woman suffrage, election laws, and the control of industry, but all of these have been carried on without any questioning of the fundamental tenets of democracy (so far as political democracy is concerned) developed by previous generations. Indeed the general drift of theory, until very recently, has been toward extending the implications of the earlier creed. It is fair to say that the fundamentals of theory were assumed without question by any large element and only the details of government discussed.

In short, the democratic ideal was formed in the United States because of certain particular circumstances and desires growing out of the struggle against Great Britain, the frontier with its free land, something approximating economic independence and even equality in the West, and the agitation against slavery. It continued, almost without question, in spite of the noncontinuance of these causes. It is the purpose of the remainder of this paper to point out certain tendencies

which appear to be not entirely in harmony with the traditional American theory of popular government. I shall consider, first, what may be termed an institutional drift, second, the extent to which the electorate is failing to fulfill the demands of such a system, and, third, certain recent theories dealing with the unworkability in society as presently constituted of government by the people.

#### II

Most important among the tendencies which I shall mention under the head of what has been termed "institutional drift" is the rapid growth of the functions of government. A century or more ago it was customary to assume that no government would be needed if men were perfect, i.e., that the only essential function of government is keeping the peace. In this day of public schools and public highways; of regulation of all forms of industry and of most forms of labor; of government aid to farmers, shippers, lumbermen, miners and scientists; of social insurance, old age pensions and maternity laws; of public health work and vocational guidance—such a theory is literally unintelligible. Government is fast becoming a glorified social service agency, or set of agencies; as Sir William Harcourt put it, "We are all socialists now." John Stuart Mill was only the first and greatest of those who have started out to defend Benthamism and remained to be prophets or apostles of Fabianism. In fact it might almost be said that the increase in governmental functions proceeds in direct proportion to the amount of criticism heaped upon the socialist principles. Bureaucracy seems to thrive upon condemnation.

It is needless to labor the point that this socialization has not only made government more expensive but also vastly more complex and therefore less understandable, even in its every-day functions, to the citizen. The age of science and of the machine has brought with it scores of public services which can be thoroughly understood and competently directed only by the expert. They are not matters to be decided by appeal to either moral or political principles, but rather by trained and experienced specialists acting on the basis of exact information. Nor does there appear to be any possibility of lessening this complexity or diminishing the need for expert service,

Incidentally, there has been not only an increase in the duties of all governmental agencies in the United States but also a rapid centralization of powers and services in the National Government at the expense of the states. One of the major tenets of the early democratic faith was local control of all except national functions; yet today there are but few who really oppose this nationalizing tendency, except when the federal authorities threaten to tread upon some particular cherished and protected interest of the states or of some important element in the states. The doctrine of state rights has become one of expediency rather than principle. Of course it has always been used to defend some local or sectional interest but at least it was given a relatively definite and important meaning. Now it is relegated to the formal and usually meaningless portions of stump speeches and political platforms. The trend of such declarations of state rights faith is probably indicated with fair accuracy by the Texas Democratic Platform of 1922. In addition to the traditional expression of allegiance to the "autonomy of the states and their unsurrendered sovereignty," there are five sections bearing on the question of state-federal relations. One of them favors the states (restoration of the rate-making power to state commissions); the other four express approval of recent extensions of federal power or call for the passage of laws which would extend even farther the powers of the central government at the expense of the states.

A second movement that seems to have significance for the student of the present position of democracy in the United States is the decline in the prestige, influence and power of the representatives of the people in the legislatures. There is no way of proving whether the legislatures are more or less competent than they were a century ago, but there does seem to be sufficient evidence to indicate their lowered standing. This evidence might be secured from writings of either a popular or a scholarly nature, but even more reliable is the evidence derived from the institutional changes which were both caused by and causes of the decline of the legislatures.

First among these changes is the growth of constitutional restrictions. Whereas the early constitutions were characterized by legislative supremacy and the bills of rights were almost the only and certainly the most conspicuous restrictions upon legislative powers, so far as limitations contained in the fundamental law are concerned, these are now far overshadowed by all manner of limiting provisions, dealing with subjects important and trivial, and frequently dealing with them in very detailed fashion. While the increase of such limitations is not the sole cause of the greatly increased length of recent State Constitutions it is the main one. Surely no people who placed much trust in their representatives would have incorporated into their Constitutions such a staggering array of minute limitations upon the power of the legislatures to enact laws concerning counties, towns, villages and cities, corporations, partnerships and labor, railroads and municipal public utilities, highways and waterways, pensions and legislative salaries. So afraid have they been that their representatives would do harm that they have in many cases made it impossible for them to do anything at all.

Quite akin to this development is the rapid growth within the last half century of the institution of judicial review. Once used but rarely, the courts have so extended its application that they have come to be boards of review for almost the whole body of legislation. The use of the judicial veto in connection with the judicial creations of due process of law and liberty of contract is a long way from government by the people; and yet the people have acquiesced in such practice, mainly because of their lack of faith in their legislatures, just as they have during thousands of years acquisced in military or landed or religious aristocracies. Burgess was not far

wrong when he spoke of the aristocracy of the robe in the United States. And it is none the less an aristocracy for resting upon popular consent, whether tacit or express. It may well be pointed out here that although there have been occasional protests against this increased power of the courts the protest has never been more than a local one or one which was the product of a minority group. It was LaFollette who attacked the work of the Supreme Court and proposed methods for restraining the freedom of exercise of that power, but it was Coolidge, the defender of the court, who received the vast majority of the votes.

Another aspect of this same question is to be found in the rise of executive leadership. The center of interest, both in elections and in the administration of government, has undoubtedly shifted to that branch of the political system. Not only has the interest shifted from the Legislature and Congress to the governors and the President, but the power and the opportunity for a very great amount of influence have gone with it. The legal powers of the executives have grown rather steadily and are now of no inconsiderable proportions, but the extralegal powers are frequently of even greater importance. The many examples afforded by the last quarter of a century make evident the extent to which a strong governor or president may determine the legislative as well as the executive policy. Of course, the executive must have party backing in the legislature in order to do this, but the significant thing is that unless his own party is in a minority there it has become a very frequent thing for him to be of greater importance in the legislative mechanism than the nominal leaders within the houses of that body. Now it may or may not be true that one man can be as completely representative of the people of a state or of the whole country as the hundreds of members of the legislative bodies. For one, I am inclined to believe that such a statement sounds suspiciously like the Rousseauian fiction of the general will, but I do not consider that point a necessary one to the present discussion. From the point of view of this paper the significant factors are that the growth of executive power has been due in great part to the loss of confidence in legislative bodies and that the growth of such centralized power is a change from earlier ideals and, to a somewhat lesser extent, from earlier practice.

The wave of enthusiasm for the initiative and referendum which swept parts of the country a few years ago was in some ways a logical development from the creed of democracy, but it also represented one aspect of the institutional change caused by the decline of the legislatures. Furthermore, the disillusion which followed shortly after its introduction indicated that direct democracy had no longer a chance of playing a very great part in the working of American government. It now seems that the crest of the wave in favor of direct legislation has passed, at least so far as states and nation are concerned, and that it will be an important institution only in the cities, if, indeed, it can long survive even in the smaller areas.

A third institutional movement to be considered here is that for efficiency and economy in administration. The extent to which it has been advocated by several governors of the past fifteen years, notably Lowden of Illinois, Smith of New York and Ritchie of Maryland, and the extent to which their reputation as national figures has been due to their success in securing changes along this line shows that the emphasis placed upon this particular reform movement by the political scientists has not been a case of backing the wrong horse. Since the movement is one with many features and many ramifications it must suffice here to point out that its keynote is centralization of power and the application of expert services to the solution of administrative problems. It has as its corrollary the replacement of the spoils system by one in which appointments to the civil service shall be made on the basis of training and competency. Jackson probably argued wisely from the facts as he saw them in the simple environment of his times, but it has long since been evident that those facts have ceased to exist; and the merit principle is at least as applicable to the Great Society of the present time as the spoils system was to the Tennessee community in which Jackson spent most of his non-military days. Evidence for this is to be found not only in the logic of circumstances and in the inefficient results produced in those states which have clung to the old system but also in the growth of the merit principle in the federal service from the time, just after the passage of the Pendleton Act, when it applied to some 14,000

clerks to the present when it covers appointments and promotions to a third of a million positions of the most diversified kind, and in its widespread use in the more advanced states. That we are as yet but in the introductory period of its development in the United States few who have studied its history in European governments and in our own will doubt. Not only will it continue to be applied to more offices but an increasing stress will be placed upon the element of efficiency. Unfortunately for the system most of the attention has heretofore had to be put upon getting the spoilsman out; it has only recently been possible, and then in but a few cases, to center upon the problem of getting the competent man in and then keeping him in.

The fourth and last institutional movement to be considered in this paper is the one that has come into great popularity in recent years under the title of the short ballot principle. This is also something of a corollary of the movement for administration efficiency, but it is also more than that. According to this principle not only would very few if any administrative officers be selected by the electorate but also more officials in other branches of public service, the judges for example, would likewise be selected by some method other than popular election. It is not contended that a short ballot is necessarily inconsistent with a democratic form of government; it is urged that the movement has for its essential premise the belief that the electoral capacity of the people is limited and that it is therefore a change from the ideals of the framers of American democratic theory. The movement for the election of all important political officers which had its beginnings in the Jacksonian epoch is no longer in existence. Of course, it is also true that few states have adopted a short ballot, even in modified form, but this is partly due to the difficulty of amending state constitutions. The movement has met with more success in cities, where charters have been modified with amazing rapidity during the past twenty-five years, and the interest and faith which it has aroused in nearly all publicists probably indicates that it will be of great importance in the future reconstruction of state political systems.

#### III

The second group of factors which bear upon the problem in question has to do with the increasing extent to which voters have failed to discharge the burdens placed upon them by a democratic government. Non-voting may not be a new problem but it has only recent come into marked attention and statistics seem to show that, at least in national elections, the interest of the voters is declining. Furthermore, this decline comes in spite of the spectacular character of our quadrennial parade and the millions spent in advertising it. All efforts to capture the attention and to enlist the interest of the voter work with but indifferent success. From 1856 to 1898 the vote for president remained fairly constant at about 80% of the qualified electorate. Since then it has slumped almost as steadily, until in 1920 and 1924 only half of the voters came to the polls. It does not seem possible to account for this change on any grounds other than lack of interest. There are, of course, other causes; but they are substantially the same over a long period of years, and, indeed, one of the reasons for much of the non-voting of a quarter of a century ago-absence from home at election time-has been generally removed by absentee voting laws.

The more careful investigations of state and local conditions serve to show that the condition for the national election is carried into those governmental divisions. The elaborate inquiry undertaken in Chicago by Professor Merriam and Dr. Gosnell indicates that most of the non-voters in that city simply haven't sufficient interest in the process of choosing their rulers to overcome the slightest obstacles which may be in their path. Of a total of about 1,400,000 eligible electors in that city only about 723,000 finally voted at the election of 1923, 500,000 of them having failed even to register.

Nor do we have to leave Texas to find even less favorable figures. The average vote on constitutional amendments under the Constitution of 1876 has been only 20% to 25% of the qualified vote.<sup>2</sup> It has long been the accepted theory that the

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup>C. E. Merriam and H. F. Gosnell, Non-Voting: Causes and Methods of Control

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup>Irvin Stewart, Constitutional Amendments in Texas, Southwestern Political Science Quarterly, III, 145.

fundamental law is the expressed will of the people and yet in but rare cases, notably when the prohibition issue was raised, have more than one-fifth of the voters manifested sufficient interest in changes in that law to cast a ballot. Furthermore, the vote has averaged only 40% as much as that cast for governor in the preceding election, which in turn has usually been less than half of the total possible vote. In 1921, for example, when five proposed amendments were submitted, no one of them received more than 23% of the vote cast for governor in 1920.

Perhaps it will not be out of place to carry the investigation one step farther, even though to do so takes us from the firm ground of statistical measurement. It is not enough to say that when a majority of the voters do go to the polls the people are therefore governing. More and more has it been recognized that it is necessary to go back of the voting to the problems of political leadership and control. An ever-increasing number of students of government are becoming aware that much of the dogma of democracy which hinges on the notion of popular self-government through the ballot is pure fiction. Naturally their own theory of democracy has been altered somewhat as a result. Since the time of Bryce and Ostrogorski there have been dozen of books and countless articles written to show that the function of the people in contemporary political society is little more than that of the ventriloguist's obliging dummy. This is not the place to consider the truth of such views so much as it is the place in which to note that they are held by thousands of publicists, teachers, students, and probably by a very great many who have no better claim to special knowledge than the fact that they are citizens and voters. It is easy enough to see how such conclusions can be reached. The man who reads newspaper accounts of national nominating conventions has enough evidence to make him suspicious of much of the campaign thunder which later attempts to engulf him. He may see, as in 1920, the leaders in presidential primaries and straw ballots passed over for a man who stood well toward the foot of the list, and he may hear that the selection was the work of a scant half-dozen party leaders. He may see further that the opposition candidates were chosen by much the same process. He may even read the platforms of the parties and

then wonder for just what he will be voting when he casts a ballot for Mr. A rather than Mr. B. And he may end by coming to the conclusion that after all the only real difference between them is found in the membership of the small group by whom the candidate is controlled and upon whom he will depend for advice. That is, he may come to much the same conclusion reached by Colonel House long before he entered politics, that a half-dozen or so men run the Government, the other hundreds of officeholders being mere figureheads.3 Without the unparalleled opportunities of the late Lord Bryce for observing the workings of democracy in this and other countries, although perhaps with the same life-long hopes for the success of democracy, he might come to believe that we actually have, not government by the many but by the few, not by the mass of citizens, but by a handful of deeply interested leaders.

#### IV

The theories of politics to be discussed in the third part of this investigation are a perfectly logical outgrowth of the developments and ideas already mentioned, as well as of certain other tendencies with which this paper cannot attempt to deal. Writers of the past few years who have, in one way or another, questioned the competency of the people to take any very important part in directing the processes of present day government have not doubted the desirability of government in the interest of the whole people, of freedom, or of substantial equality of opportunity. To the contrary they have usually argued that it is to gain these ends in greater measure that the American ideal of government by the people must be modified. Contributions to this type of criticism are not many, nor is it yet possible to ascertain their importance for the future, but they do seem to be growing in both number and following.

The strangely hybrid, mechanistic-Darwinian process of selection proposed by Mr. Frank Exline in his *Politics* is at once the most extreme and the least likely of adoption of any recent plans for the re-making of our governmental system. Its importance lies in the fact that it represents the desires of an as yet uncertain number of people to get away from what they consider to be the evils of attempted government by

the people. And it would be a very long distance away, for Mr. Exline would abolish the elective system and turn the state into a glorified civil service system. It is a sort of statistico-psychological variation on the old desire for government by the best rather than by all.

While Exline represents a newer departure from an old faith, Professor Irving Babbitt is content to bring forth an expression of faith in substantially the ideals upheld by Edmund Burke. It is not that he would have us return to rotten boroughs or a House of Lords or even control in the landed gentry. But the place of democracy in his theory of Democracy and Leadership might almost be likened to the place of the rabbit in the famous '50-50 rabbit hash'-one rabbit to one horse. Professor Babbitt has very little faith in government by the masses and I for one am inclined to believe that there are more who sympathize with his classic aristocratic ideals than has generally been assumed. It is also to be noticed that not even Mr. Mencken's scorn for the poor souls in the professorate kept him from reviewing Babbitt's work in a sympathetic, if condescending manner. Without attempting to say just what Mr. Mencken believes it is possible to say that his erratic but forceful attacks on American life and politics may turn out to be of considerable importance in the reshaping of American political thought, and at least that that influence will not be toward greater democracy.

In any democratically organized community there are doubtless always a few dissenters. It is a striking fact about recent political thought in this country that some of the most ardent liberals, in a time and place where liberals are ordinarily rated as relatively extreme democrats, appear to be drifting to a type of faith quite unlike the democracy of former times. If a member of the Union League Club were to express doubts concerning the ability of the people to direct all branches of the public service no one would be particularly surprised or concerned, but for one of the most brilliant writers among the advanced liberals to attack the old and tacitly accepted theory of the omnicompetent citizen means that a movement out of the ordinary is under way. The older works on public opinion took for granted the satisfactory character of this

<sup>3</sup> Charles Seymour, The Intimate Papers of Colonel House, I, 16.

democratic some-what if only it could find adequate and uncorrupted means of expression. Mr. Walter Lippmann, in his Public Opinion and his Phantom Public proceeds to enter into heretical doubts as to whether we have the right kind of pictures in our heads, whether we are not more given to stereotyped codes than to careful inductions from ample evidence, whether we even know our own interests. He has the temerity to imply that public opinion is not true opinion unless it is based upon knowledge rather than prejudice, and he even asserts that "The making of one general will out of a multitude of general wishes is not an Hegelian mystery, as so many social philosophers have imagined, but an art known to leaders, politicians and steering committees."4 And when one reads his article entitled "Why Should the Majority Rule?" in which he asserts that the principle of rule by the majority is a "mere political expedient worth using only when it is necessary or demonstrably useful to the conduct of affairs,"5 one can but wonder just how he would change the present order, and conclude that at least Mr. Lippmann no longer finds in the writings of Jackson and Lincoln a completely satisfactory philosophy of politics. It is also a little surprising to find that Professor Henry Jones Ford would discard the theory that it is the function of a representative assembly to be an accurate reflection of the community because there is no such ideal unity as a term like people or community connotes. Instead, he argues, there is endless multiplicity, great inequality and continual variation. What we need is not reflection of the community, indeed that is a vain and impossible ideal, but government by men of special knowledge and capacity, "subject to responsibility for results."6

In a lecture delivered in Austin recently Professor Alexander Meiklejohn began by a declaration of faith in democracy, which he defined as a "community of people organized on the supposition that people are what they are not. Democracy carries on as if people were intelligent, assuming that people are capable and willing to think, and our democracy operates on that proposition." However, at the end of his speech he

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>4</sup>The Phantom Public, 47.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>5</sup>Harper's Magazine, March, 1926.

<sup>6</sup>Representative Government, 147.

expressed it to be his opinion that scholars should cease to study for the mere love of their subject and should take their rightful place as the leaders of the thought of the people, as the moulders of public opinion. Not only does this conclusion smack of the ideal of the philosopher kings of the Republic but it is surprisingly like the letter written by Alexander Hamilton in 1787 in which that believer in rule by a few said that he considered the people "in general as very ill qualified to judge for themselves" about affairs political. They should exercise and profit by their inherent political rights by being "tractable and docile," and permitting men of "genius and learning" to govern for them. It is indeed food for thought when so staunch a libertarian as Professor Meiklejohn, a man too radical for the regents of Amherst College, a man who professes to a faith in the democratic ideal, expounds the doctrine of rule by an aristocracy of learning, for certainly the framers of public opinions are, in the last analysis, the governors of the state.

#### V

When Rousseau said that the general will is always right but that the judgment guiding it is not always enlightened he was probing the difficulty inherent in majority rule, for the meaningful part of that statement is a questioning of the competency of popular government, an application of the qualitative test; the rest is optimistic metaphysics. Even Jefferson said that the will of the majority, to be rightful, must be reasonable. It took the extreme frontier democracy and the injection of bitter moral issues into the slavery controversy to develop the dogma that the people's will is always right, that it is necessary only to have a majority vote in order to find the solution of any given political problem. And yet Rousseau had in mind a small, relatively uncomplicated city state, Jefferson a small agrarian state. Rousseau believed democracy to be unworkable in a large state, Jefferson in an industrialized population. We have both.

John Stuart Mill effectively destroyed the Utilitarian calculus by re-introducing the qualitative standard. An analogous

movement seems to be under way in the study of public opinion and of nearly all governmental processes bearing upon the question of the rule of the people. No longer are all publicists willing to rest content with the simple democratic method of counting heads; they inquire concerning the amount of knowledge and quality of interest involved in that count. Some of them seem to desire to shift from the principle of securing complete representation of the people to that of judging by the results obtained. An example of this is to be found in the attitude toward legislatures. Many and many a time have I read or heard highly unfavorable opinions about the merits of our legislatures and of their work; not once have I read or heard the assertion that they are not at least a typical cross-section of the community. If our legislatures have declined, it is significant that they have declined along with the broadening of the suffrage. It may well be that their only fault is that they are too representative of the people and that the only remedy is to make them unrepresentative. We cannot hope to better the legislative output by simplifying their problems. A considerable extension of the legislative reference-bureau movement might aid to some extent, but it could not bring the change desired by so many people. I am inclined to believe that many writings of recent years, and, I might add, many conversations with people from varied ranks of society and with different approaches to the problem, point in the direction of the replacement of the American delegate theory of representation by something like that expressed by Burke in his address to his constituents at Bristol. And with the decline of the desire to have the legislators act as mere agents for the registering of public opinion there seems to be a growth of the sentiment in favor of electing the "best" men to office and then leaving considerably more to their discretion.

On the other hand, it may be that the recent dissatisfaction with legislatures will continue to point in the direction of

<sup>7</sup>P. L. Ford, Essays on the Constitution, 287.

government by the expert who holds office on no such shaky tenure as that afforded by election. It is yet hardly possible to determine whether we are likely soon to develop government by a bureaucracy with the consent and, occasionally, the advice of the elected representatives of the people; but that is a condition which seems to be a not unlikely stage in the evolution of American political institutions.

One of the most significant changes in the structure of American society has been the growing amount of economic differentiation. De Tocqueville found equality of condition to be the fundamental fact of American society—the basis of the political and social institutions of democracy. Common observation and statistics alike show that such is no longer the case. The most acute observers of political institutions since the time of Plato and Aristotle have held that diffused political power and concentrated economic power cannot long dwell together. The ablest builders of American political theory realized that very keenly; subsequent generations have been trying to ignore it. Whether we can long continue to follow such an ostrich-like policy is doubtful. When economic lines become sharply drawn, social and political differentiation follows sooner or later. This is not to say that economic stratification is the only source of such cleavage or that the development of a thoroughly socialized state, or even the adoption of complete communism, would remove such class lines. It was in the socialist parties of Europe that Robert Michels found the most striking cases of autocratic organization.

Whether the cause is mainly economic or not I am unable to say, but certainly it seems that in the field of educational theory the trend is toward the frank recognition of differences of needs and abilities rather than toward a continuation of the former ideal of one curriculum for all. However, it is to soon to predict just what effect this will have upon political life and institutions, just as it is not yet time to prophesy the results of the wave of psychological examinations. But at least it is entirely possible that one or both of them will aid

in bringing about still further defections from democratic monism.

My essential premise in this paper is that the democratic dogma accepted by the most influential leaders of the pre-Civil War period and developed into truism by the succeeding generation called for something more than the fiction of legal sovereignty in the mass of the people, that it was implicitly an ideal of self-government. I have doubted whether such theories are still true generalizations from the facts of our time. It has seemed to me that we are on what may be termed the upgrade of another democratic cycle, that, as in the federalist period, the demand is more and more for good rather than popular government. This is not a change that has come suddenly, nor is it yet completed. And, of course, it is in no way a sign of degeneracy in the body politic. Unless we are to become true Confucians and canonize the ideas of the past, set up static ideals like the 100% Americanism of the Ku Klux Klan, our principles of political progress must be based upon relative rather than absolute qualities. The only "good" form of government is one suited to the economic, social, educational, religious and geographic environment and to the people who are to live under it. The only "bad" form is one calling for more or less of effort, interest, support, enlightenment and workability than the environment and the citizens make possible. We have clung to the ideal of democracy because it is interoven in our traditions as a nation, but we have neglected to remember that it did not come because of itself but because of other ends which no longer need be struggled for, and that with the rise of new problems it may prove to be poor theory because unworkable in practice. At the present time we do not support it as it requires because it is no longer one of our really primary interests and because it is infinitely more difficult to support than was the case fifty or a hundred years ago.

#### THE MEXICAN IMMIGRANT IN TEXAS\*

#### BY MAX SYLVIUS HANDMAN

The Mexican immigrant who comes to Texas-and the same can be said of California-has a feeling of coming to a familiar place. The river which he crosses has a Spanish name. Out of 254 counties that he might go to 40 have Spanish names. Our towns and cities have Spanish names. When he comes to live in San Antonio or San Marcos or Llano or Cuero or El Paso, he will probably live on Zarzamora Street or Presa Street or Brazos or Nueces Street. When he takes sick he goes to the Santa Rosa Hospital. He can go to the cathedral to hear a Spanish sermon. He needs in fact to know not a word of English to live from the cradle to the grave. His children can go through life with hardly any knowledge of English. In San Antonio I have visited schools with none other but Mexican children and in class after class I have found native born Mexican children who spoke a very broken and utterly inadequate English.

The Mexican population in Texas, the largest of any state in the Union, is divided into three separate groups. There is first of all the group of political refugees, chiefly concentrated in San Antonio. They are usually people of some means, some even very well to do, belonging to the party of the "outs" who are waiting for a better wind to trim their sails for home. They are a highly educated, sophisticated and mentally alert group, living among themselves and for themselves, keeping strictly apart from the American community and the swarming numbers of their own kind. This is the group from which leaders could be recruited for the masses, if this group were interested enough in the lot of its unfortunate countrymen. But from home they have never been required to take any interest in the masses except as exploiters. The Mexican masses mean nothing to them in Mexico and they mean nothing to them in Texas.

The second group is made up of the Texas Mexicans, the Texanos. They are the descendants of the original Texas

<sup>\*</sup>Paper read before the National Conference for Social Work at the annual meeting in Cleveland May 31, 1926.

Mexican population to which have been added the second. third and fourth generations of those who drifted in and settled in Texas. Along the border they are numerous and they present the usual border situation. They are bilingual, forming a separate and in some instances an economically independent group. An exception to this is the Lower Rio Grande Valley which has been going through a period of great speculative growth due to the use of irrigation and cheap Mexican labor. Where cattle grazing predominates and on ranches one finds a good many of these Texanos acting either as cowboys but mainly in tanking outfits, supplying the animals with water. Some of them own larger ranches where life goes on chiefly after the manner of a Mexican hacienda with never an English word spoken or heard. As long as the Texanos were small in number, they presented no very serious situation either to themselves or to the surrounding community. But with the tremendous immigration of recent years their position has been sensibly modified. But of that more later.

The last group is made up of the large number of casual laborers who have drifted in or have been attracted into Texas as a result of the recent changes in the American labor market. This casual labor group has raised the number of Mexicans in Texas in the last ten years to over half a million and probably very much more, but we cannot say definitely how much more.

The Mexican immigrant presents many of the problems which are found among any other immigrant group. But it is with the specifically Mexican aspects of this immigration insofar as it is represented in Texas, that I am concerned here. The unusually casual character of a good deal of this immigration strikes us at first sight. No other immigration has come to us which shifts back and forth between America and the home country as much as does the Mexican immigration. It is not at all a serious undertaking for the Mexican to come to America, certainly not nearly as serious as the undertaking of any other immigrant group that has come to America heretofore. This gives the Mexican population a kaleidoscopic character which strikes one very forcefully when he visits a Mexican community in Texas at an interval of eight months or even less. Texas is the corridor and clearing house for the majority of the Mexican casuals who are distributed over the country. The Government labor agent who,

however, keeps no records of his clientele, estimates that his agency has shipped out of San Antonio in one year over 200,000 Mexicans. The mere statement of the fact suggests at once the problem created by such an enormous stream of shifting humanity. What becomes of the housing situation in a community subject to such an enormous and ever-recurrent dislocation of the population? The single male immigrant makes for the boarding-house situation where we have overcrowding amounting to disaster, while the immigrant who brings his family is the proper tenant for the \$2 or \$3 a week corral with one room, a leanto, outside toilet and water facilities, no furniture and impossible hygiene. Housing control is out of the question under such circumstances, living quarters are at a premium and it takes a system of city government possible only in a New Jerusalem to keep a vigilant eye over housing conditions under these circumstances. Fortunately, the climate forces the population to outdoor living during the major portion of the year and the evil is partly remedied in this manner. Ultimately, however, all this makes for an exceedingly difficult stabilization of housing conditions, amounting to hopelessness.

The second point in this immigration is its agricultural character. We are witnessing a phenomena which has happened once before in our history, when the German, Irish and Scandinavian immigrants came as farm laborers and remained as farmers. The difference between this early immigration and the Mexican immigration is that the Mexican comes as laborer and remains a farm laborer, and that of a unique kind—unique for America. The consequences are very significant for Texas agricultural life. The Mexican agricultural laborer has come into those parts of Texas where the soil has been too depleted to maintain an American tenant farmer and pay rent on the land. The Mexican works for less, he can be supervised more easily, and the problem of labor is solved by his working the whole family and living in conditions which the American farmer would not tolerate. Even then his living and working conditions are better than he has been accustomed to in Mexico. The result has been a migration of the white farmer to the city and the concentration of large blocks of land in the hands of white owners who operate them with Mexican labor. In short, we are having a modern plantation system, or a European-Mexican agrarian-peon capitalism. In other parts-particularly those of recent speculative growth-Mexican labor, more used to the manner of working on irrigated land, has made possible this speculative growth, for without cheap Mexican labor this would have been impossible. The Mexican is also displacing the negro on The negro, because he has greater mobility, which comes to him because of his knowledge of English and familiarity with the American environment, will not work under the terms and conditions under which the Mexican works. He will move to the city or perhaps acquire land of his own. It is interesting to note that the Mexican farmer-peon is not slow in acquiring an automobile. The working arrangement is the share plan, the white owner supporting him during the winter. The difference between this form of tenancy and the negro tenancy is the grater control that the white owner exercises over the farmer and the very unstable economic relationship. On a farm in central Texas where there are nearly forty tenants, when a drought came last summer, everyone of the tenants packed his family and belongings into his Ford and moved off to another part of the State where there was a crop and where he could make a living by picking cotton.

One fact in connection with the Mexican agricultural invasion stands out as of considerable interest. Texas has a number of farming groups made up of Polish and Bohemian immigrants. The Mexican tenant and laborer has encircled these groups and practically surrounded them, but has not been able to penetrate into the interior. The reason is simple enough to anyone who is familiar with the Polish and Bohemian farmer. Their land-hunger is so keen that they will never let go of a piece of land once they have acquired it. What is more, they will work and dig; every member of the family, and save and skimp in order to acquire more land so that every male member will have at least a 40-acre farm to start his housekeeping and family life.

This increase in the size of the Mexican farmer has had some very disastrous consequences upon the effort of the American community to keep up its school system. Partly because of the gradual moving away of the white farmers with his tradition of schooling and self-help in matters of schooling, and partly due to the concentration of land, a concentration which will accumulate taxes on him who has accumulated land; the rural schools in many Texas communities have been disrupted and the result would have been even more tragic if the State had not come to their assistance by means of a form of State aid. In other places it has made necessary the keeping up of two separate schools, one for Americans and the other for Mexicans entailing a greater financial burden than the community is able to shoulder. In still other places, however, it has worked out advantageously to the American community which is utilizing the whole of the State aid given on the basis of the total number of scholastics, American and Mexican, solely for the support of the Americans.

Returning now to the economic effect of the Mexican casual we notice a further point in the possibility of utilizing cheap Mexican labor in industrial occupations either under sweatshop or factory conditions. This development is beginning to take place but is not sufficiently advanced for us to say much about it. The displacement of the negro by the Mexican on railroad construction is proceeding at a rapid pace.

But the thing that is of greatest significance is not the casual Mexican but the sedentary Mexican. When he settles down and decides to become a part of the American community, that is when he presents the most serious difficulties.

America has no technique for handling colored, or partly colored persons on any other basis but that of a subordinated or isolated group. In Texas where the negro is such an integral element of our population the usual Southern view prevails. The Mexican present shades of color ranging from that of the negro—although no negro features—to that of the white. The result is confusion. A Mexican girl enters a street car and sits down among the whites and the conductor tells her to sit among the negroes. She refuses on the ground that she is "no nigger." A Mexican worker on a city job where both negroes and white men are employed refuses to drink out of the negro drinking cup and the foreman beats him up. A party made up of the Mexican consul and his suite reach a small town for a celebration. After the celebration they adjourn to a restaurant to eat. The restaurant

keeper refuses to serve them in the dining room but offers to serve them in the kitchen. In a rural community the Mexicans refuse to send their children to the special Mexican school when they are not permitted to send them to the American school. In the main we can say that the Mexican has been keeping to himself, but as he begins to share more and more in the occupations and activities of his American neighbor—even in a subordinate capacity—the situation is becoming strained. The theory that the Mexican is a white man is receiving its acid test.

At the same time we have a curious loss of perspective in the contact between the races. An American school girl was scolded by her teacher for having been seen riding in an automobile with her arms around two boys. She replied in an off-hand way, "Oh, well, they were only Mexicans!"

Yet gradually and inevitably the Mexican in Texas is settling down to become a permanent part of the community. The process is visibly beginning even with the semi-nomadic peon. Many of them buy property in San Antonio, little houses or huts which they close up while they are away working and return to live in them when the slack season has set in. Some of them buy small plots of land on which they erect houses as good as they can afford. Others, and rather large numbers, are falling in with the American idea of home-owning, and real estate companies are doing a flourishing business in opening up Mexican additions in the new parts of town. The tendency is growing on the part of the Mexicans to come with their families, leave them in San Antonio, go to Michigan or Mississippi to work, and return to them when work is over. Others take their families with them and return to put the children in school as soon as they can. They show a decided interest in the schooling of their offspring, in some instances amounting to a passion. The children themselves are almost addicted to it-voluntary truancy is quite unknown. The causes which make for truancy are usually the poverty of the parents who cannot afford to supply the children with the necessary clothing for a decent appearance, or a lack of money with which to buy school supplies. Yet this interest in schooling gives way as soon as the child is able to add to family income. The Mexicans do not exploit their children. but they cannot see any use for more than a little education when the making of a living is so hard a task. School teachers seldom complain of Mexican children, they are usually obedient and appreciative, with a tendency to show extreme devotion to the teacher.

In point of intellectual outfit the Mexican child presents a serious problem in the age-grade distribution. The Mexican children usually rank lower in grade and higher in age than the American children. Yet a very interesting conclusion was reached by mental tests carried on in connection with the recent school survey of Texas. Investigators found that the city Mexican ranks higher than the rural white, although he ranks lower than the urban white. The rural Mexican ranks below the rural white. It is also interesting to note that the Mexican does better in non-verbal than in verbal tests. All this leads one to look for a greater influence of psychoenvironmental causes than is usually the case. The inability to speak or understand English adequately; irregular attendance due to casual labor conditions and a general timidity in meeting the American school environment may have something to do with it.

In matters of health they present a serious problem. Tuberculosis, syphilis and gento-urinary diseases take an exceedingly heavy toll among them. Of course, the terrific overcrowding has something to do with it, also the exceeding sensitiveness to cold of the Mexican and his insufficient and unwise clothing. Apparently they come with a predisposition for tuberculosis, to judge by the mortality in Mexico City from that cause. Gastro-intestinal diseases play a greater role in Mexico than they do here probably because of the better feeding here than in Mexico. An addiction to meat and coffee are the chief changes in his dietary habits. Gastro-intestinal diseases are shown to loom larger in the summer due to the consumption of spoiled milk.

Family life shows strong patriarchial traits. The family ritual, particularly in the care of girls, is just as strong in the peon class as it is among the upper or middle classes. Yet the physicians with whom I have talked complain of a very large number of illegitimate births and the court records show echoes of the situation. This is probably the result of a

strict family code with a rapid substitution of a city environment for a village environment and a large number of unmarried men taken from their family moorings in search of work. Some very interesting observations could be made, in connection with family life, between the attitude of the Texanos—or Texas Mexicans of two or three generations and the newcomers. The former have adjusted themselves to the new environment and are keeping thir families intact. The latter—although they look with contempt upon the family relations of the former—are suffering the greatest devastations.

Religiously the Mexican immigrant shows not quite the same devotion to the church that he did in Mexico. Protestant denominations are making some inroad into the traditional faith. A partial survey of Dallas, where some 350 families were visited, showed nearly 40 protestants. However, one should not take this too seriously as the interest in the protestant religion is often the outgrowth of some protestant dispensary or kindergarten. Yet it is not without significance that San Antonio has five or six protestant Mexican churches where services are carried on in Spanish to an audience that is attentive and, apparently, appreciative.

I will have to hasten over the other factors: The interest in American newspapers rather than Spanish, in English books and magazines, and of course American movies, and I will come to the crucial situation, the possibility of accepting the Mexican group as a permanent and integral part of our population.

Here I have very little good to tell. A group that is brought or lured here for purposes of economic exploitation will carry with it the stigmata of that exploitation. It is wanted for no other purposes, and it will soon find that there is no place for it under any other conditions. Yet the Mexican cannot be kept forever in subordination. He is not a negro and he will refuse the status of the negro. The only road open to him is to form a third, separate group, on the border line between the negro and the white man. Such a situation cannot last for long; it soon becomes intolerable because the temptation of the white group is to push him down into the negro group, while the efforts of the Mexican will be directed toward raising himself to the level of the white group. The

result will inevitably be bitterness, animosity and conflict. The negro-white situation is difficult enough, but it is simple. The negro has his place in the scheme of things. He is disfranchised and he accepts it-for how long I do not know-but he accepts it. He is limited in his educational opportunities and in his occupational field and he accepts that also. But the Mexican is theoretically not limited either in his educational opportunities or in his occupational field. Neither is he disfranchised. He is educating himself rapidly, only to find that his education above the literarcy line is quite useless to him. He will soon be going to college in large numbers and he will soon wield an emphatic and brilliant English pen. He will organize his group politically and then what? Will he tolerate a school system which gives white children a good school building and nine months of schooling and the Mexican children in the same community five months of schooling and a miserable wooden structure; and which spends on fifty-eight white children \$1,669 and on 182 Mexican children \$724. I am not afraid of social conflicts, but social conflicts waged on the basis of race or nationality are the most cruel, the most intense and the most useless. And for the sake of a speeding up in the exploitation of our natural resources and the creation of a handful of newly-rich and a greater consumption of high priced automobiles, are we creating for ourselves a social problem full of dismal prospects, of race-hatreds, and bruised feelings and social ostracisms and, perhaps, lynchings and the race wars of a twentieth century American city.

## THE RAILROAD PROBLEM OF THE UNITED STATES

BY SAMUEL O. DUNN, Editor of the Railway Age

Just a little more than one hundred years ago there began a revolution in transportation which was to work a revolution in the economic condition and affairs of mankind. Last year there was celebrated in England the centenary of the operation by the Stockton & Darlington Railway of the first steam railroad train ever run. Celebrations of the centennials of the chartering or the commencement of construction of different railways in the United States are now beginning to be held.

It will soon be just twenty years since a revolution began in the railroad industry of the United States. In August, 1906, the Hepburn Act passed by Congress went into effect. There had been previously more or less regulation of railways by our State and National Governments. The Hepburn Act, however, was the first law that empowered the Interstate Commerce Commission to prescribe a uniform system of accounting for the railways and that expressly and unquestionably authorized it to fix their rates.

All subsequent federal regulations of railways has been directly and indirectly an outgrowth of experience under the Hepburn Act. That law and subsequent federal legislation have resulted in an experiment in governmental supervision and control of a vast industry which in its nature and extent has had no counterpart in the world.

After a twenty years' trial of this experiment we are still discussing the "railroad problem" and passing or proposing new and important legislation for its solution. This is because nobody is yet satisfied that the experiment is a success. After 100 years of experience with railroads we are still engaged in debates and struggles because of differences of opinion as to the way in which the public welfare requires they shall be owned, managed and regulated.

We can get more light upon this great question by studying the history of railways in this and other countries than in any other way.

Our country in 1850 extended approximately 3,000 miles from the Atlantic to the Pacific Ocean, and 1,700 miles from

Canada to Mexico. It had several large navigable rivers; but between most points in its vast area there would have been, without the railroad, no means of transportation available except such as the power for which was furnished by the muscles of animals creeping feebly over primitive highways. The uniform experience of the human race shows that, in the absence of the railroad, this vast country and its natural resources would not and could not have been so developed as to create such great wealth here. In all the history of the race before the railroad was invented large wealth was created only where transportation on the seas and on large and deep rivers was readily available. Even today where there are rich natural resources, as in Siberia, or where there are vast, intelligent and industrious populations, as in China, there is nowhere large wealth and income per capita in any extensive inland territories that are not served by railroads.

From the time the first railroads were built in the United States until within the last decade the increase in their mileage and carrying capacity proceeded with a rapidity that was not even remotely approached in any other country. Between 1850 and 1890 our railroad mileage increased from 9.000 to more than 167,000 miles. It is now 250,000 miles, or five times as great as the mileage of any other country in the world. This country, with only 8 per cent of the area of the earth and 6 per cent of its population, has 37 per cent of its railroad mileage. The total trackage of our railways-including multiple main tracks, yards, etc.—exceeds 415,000 miles and would girdle the earth almost eighteen times. The railways operate almost 70,000 locomotives with an average tractive power of about 40,000 pounds each. They have almost two and one-half million freight cars with an average capacity of about forty-four and one-half tons. They have about 57,500 passenger cars. They represent an investment of approximately twenty-three billion dollars, or almost one-tenth of the nation's wealth. They employ about 1,800,000 men to whom they pay approximately \$2,800,000,000 annually in wages. They spend roughly \$1,500,000,000 annually for materials and fuel used in their maintenance and operation. Their total annual earnings are about \$6,000,000,000 and their total operating expenses are about \$4,600,000,000. They pay approximately \$365,000,000 annually in taxes. Within the last four years they have invested nearly \$3,000,000,000 of new capital in improving and enlarging their properties. The net operating income earned by them last year—that is, the part of their earnings which they could use in paying interest on their indebtedness and dividends to their stockholders—was \$1,137,000,000, or 4.83 per cent on their investment in property.

These figures show that our railroad industry has attained enormous magnitude. And yet it is no larger than is needed to meet the demands of our commerce. The United States is a vast country with a huge population, and production and commerce have been developed here on a scale never approached in any other part of the world. Without the creation of this huge railroad plant industry and commerce never could have been developed on this scale.

The principal economic service rendered by railways is the hauling of freight. Many believe the principal cause of the increase of freight business is the increase of population. This is not the case. In the thirty years from 1895 to 1925 the population of the United States increased only 63 per cent. Meantime the freight business of the railways increased 400 per cent. Of course, this means there was a very large increase in the freight hauling done for each person. In 1895 the railways did an amount of freight hauling that was equivalent to moving 1,225 tons one mile for each inhabitant of the country. This figure for 1905 was 2,214; for 1915, 2,790; and in 1925 it had increased to 3,682. It will be seen that, despite the development of motor transport, the freight service per capita demanded of the railways has continued to increase. It is much greater than the service rendered per inhabitant by the railways of any other country. If the population had not increased at all the demand of the country for railroad freight transportation apparently would have been three times as great in 1925 as in 1895. This vast increase in the hauling of freight by our railways which has occurred proves conclusively two things: first, that the railways have been developed enough to do this large amount of hauling, and, secondly, that the cost incurred by them in doing the hauling, and the rates they have charged for doing it, have been less than the value of the service rendered by them in moving freight from one place to another. In the long run the railways could not have hauled the freight if it had cost them more than the rates they could get for hauling it, and the producers could not have shipped the freight if the value of the hauling service rendered to them had not exceeded the rates they had to pay for it.

Furthermore, the producers would not have hired railways to haul their freight if they could have got it hauled cheaper by any other means. This is conclusive proof that the service provided by the railways has been the cheapest transportation service available for hauling the freight which they actually have hauled.

Of course, it always has been true that the farther the producer of a commodity has been from the major markets for that commodity the farther he has had to ship it, and, in consequence, the more he has had to pay for getting it hauled. But the facts that population and wealth, and the amount of freight hauled in all parts of the country have increased as they have and the facts that the average distance that freight has been hauled has steadily increased, and that the amount of freight service rendered for each person has continuously and rapidly increased, prove that the railways in every part of the country have hauled freight at rates which, under normal business conditions, always have enabled producers in all parts of the country to produce and ship at a profit.

It is important in this connection to take note of two points. The first is that railroad transportation has been developed on a larger scale in this country than in any other; that our railways render more service to each inhabitant than the railway system of any other country; that they have been built at a smaller cost per mile than any other important system of railways; and that they have paid their employes higher wages, and at the same time charged relatively lower rates than any other system of railways. The second important point to be noted is that, excepting the railways of Great Britain, our railways have been constructed with less governmental aid than any other system of railways in the world, and that they have been created almost entirely by the investment of private capital and by the exercise of the individual enterprise, initiative and courage peculiarly characteristic of the American people. The bearing of these facts upon the question whether, from the standpoint of the public welfare, Government or private ownership of railways is preferable, is obvious.

Now, as has already been indicated, there began a revolution in railroad transportation twenty years ago with the commencement of effective and comprehensive federal regulation. In the early history of the railways they were treated by the Government and the public much as if they were ordinary private business concerns, having a right, like most other concerns, to invest capital and issue securities, to serve their customers and to fix the rates they would charge and the wages they would pay, as they pleased, or as economic conditions compelled them to. Their managers often abused the freedom of action they enjoyed. The public became discontented and indignant. State legislatures and commissions began arbitrarily to reduce rates. Congress enacted railway laws in the exercise of its power to regulate interstate commerce. The railways appealed to the courts, claiming such regulation violated private property rights and was unconstitutional. The result was a long series of decisions by the Supreme Court of the United States in which the right and power of the public, through governmental agencies, to regulate the railways were upheld. The limitations upon this power also were defined. It was held that while regulation was constitutional it must not be confiscatory, and that to so regulate the rates of railways as to destroy their ability to earn a "fair return" upon the value of their property was confiscatory and therefore unconstitutional.

With the various decisions of the Supreme Court as a foundation, there has been built up a policy of federal regulation which has put railways—and also public utilities and other concerns held to be engaged in a "public service"—in a situation very different from that of any other kind of business concern. A railway in this country cannot now bulid a mile of new line, or issue securities, or keep any kind of account books, or charge any rate without the previous approval of the Interstate Commerce Commission. The Commission determines the safety appliances they must use on their locomotives and cars, and is now requiring them to install automatic train control. It may take charge of the distribution of their freight cars to shippers if the railways themselves do not distribute them satisfactorily. It is directed

by law to see that the railways are "efficiently, economically and honestly" managed, and in proceedings involving the rates they may charge the railways are required to satisfy the Commission that they are being thus managed. The Commission is required to determine from time to time what will be a fair return for the railways to be allowed to earn upon the value of their properties and to so fix the rates that approximately this fair return will be earned. This means, of course, that the Commission determines the amount of net operating income they may earn with which to pay the interest on their debts and dividends to their stockholders. The Commission has made a "tentative valuation" upon which it now bases its calculations to determine whether they are earning the 5% per cent annually to which it has held they are entitled. It is engaged, in pursuance of a law passed in 1913, in making a detailed and complete valuation of all their property upon which, after it is completed, the determination of what net return the railways may earn will be based.

The settlement of what wages it is reasonable for the railways to pay has been delegated to another Government body, the Railroad Labor Board, which consists of three representatives of the railways, three representatives of their employes and three representatives of the public.

It is hardly necessary to say that such lines of business as banking, manufacturing, mining, merchandising and farming are not subject to any such regulation as I have described.

The reasoning which has led to the application of this comprehensive and detailed policy of regulation to railways has been based upon two important premises. One of these is that the railroads render a service which it is essential to the public welfare shall be rendered as well and cheaply as practicable. The other is that railways are monopolies or semi-monopolistic in their nature, and in consequence, in the absence of regulation, could and would enter into and carry out agreements and combinations that would result in their making excessive profits at the cost of poor service and high rates to the public.

The question of the soundness of the legal and economic principles upon which our policy of railway regulation is based has afforded a subject for innumerable acute and interesting discussions. The way in which the policy has been carried out and the results to which it is led are, however, the matters about which we should chiefly concern ourselves.

It is easily demonstrable that throughout our twenty years of effective regulation the principal objective of Government regulation has been to make railway rates as low as practicable, and that the principal means used for attaining this objective has been that of restricting the net returns earned by the railways. The result from 1906 to the end of 1917, when Government operation was adopted, was that, excepting for occasional advances, the percentage of return earned upon their property investment declined. This was due to the fact that, although this was a period of advancing wages and prices, the general tendency of railway freight and passenger rates was downward.

Every student of economics has been taught for centuries that the amount of capital that will be attracted into an industry depends upon the present and prospective profits from investment in it. Experience soon showed that, regardless of the supposed economic nature of the railways and of the fact that they rendered a public service, this economic law was as applicable to them as to any other kind of concern or industry. Because of increasing costs of operation the railways in 1910 tried to make a general advance in rates. was disapproved by the Interstate Commerce Commission in 1911. In the latter year the new capital invested in the railroad business exceeded \$1,000,000,000. This meant, of course, that the development and expansion of the railroad industry had undergone a heavy decline. There can be no question this was due to the way rates were regulated and to the adverse effect on the net return earned.

A great increase in the country's production and commerce in 1916 caused a corresponding increase in the demands upon the railways for freight transportation. They were unable to meet these demands, although they actually handled more traffic in 1916 and 1917 than ever before. Then for twenty-six months Government operation was tried. During that time, largely owing to conditions growing out of the war, there were huge increases in operating expenses and a large advance in rates. The results of Government operation were highly unsatisfactory to the public. The railways were returned to private operation in 1920, but neither in 1918 or 1919 under

Government operation, nor in 1920 under private operation, were they able, when freight business reached record-breaking proportions, to handle it without acute congestion and large "car shortage."

All this experience convinced most thoughtful persons, including leaders in public life, that a policy of regulation that aimed mainly at restricting the net return that might be earned in the railroad industry was contrary to the public interest. The plain result of it had been to so arrest the development of the railways as to render them unable to perform their essential function of providing adequate transportation service. Consequently, when the Transportation Act of 1920, under which the railways were returned to private operation, was passed, there were incorporated provisions directing the Interstate Commerce Commission to so fix rates as to enable the railways to earn each year as nearly as might be a fair return, taking into consideration the nation's need for adequate development of its facilities of transportation.

Such a serious condition as then existed in the railroad industry could not be immediately remedied by the mere passage of a law. Under the Transportation Act there have been both advances and reductions in railway wages and rates. The return of 53/4 per cent upon the value of the properties. which the Commission has held would be reasonable and fair for the railways to earn, has never been earned. Employes have not been satisfied with their wages, shippers have not been satisfied with rates, and investors have not been satisfied with the net returns the railways have earned. But the Transportation Act encouraged railway managers and investors to believe that if sufficient new capital was invested to enable the railways to provide adequate transportation, the so-called "fair return" would be allowed to be attained and that once it had been attained it would thereafter be allowed to be earned. Consequently, as has already been said, within the last four years more than \$3,000,000,000 of new capital has been invested in our railways; and during the last three years they have rendered the best and most satisfactory service in any three consecutive years in their history.

Now, what should our 100 years of experience with railways in this country, and especially our twenty years of experience with effective federal regulation, teach us? There is one thing of the very utmost importance that it should teach us. This is, what our "railroad problem" actually is. What has been said and done about it in the past is likely to lead anyone who thinks rationally and seriously to the conclusion that almost nobody has had a properly balanced conception of what is our railroad problem. And yet, unless we conceive and state it correctly, we obviously can never get the correct answer to it.

Those who will be affected by the way the railroads are managed and regulated may be roughly divided into three classes: first, the travelers and shippers who use their service and pay their rates; secondly, their employes, to whom they pay wages; and, third, the investors who buy their bonds and stocks to get interest and dividends.

It is plain the railways cannot in the long run get enough competent employes to work for them unless they pay them wages equivalent to those they could get in other industries. It is also plain that in the long run they cannot get people to invest capital in the railroad business unless they can pay them relatively as high a return upon it as they could get by investing it in other industries. It is therefore, plain that whether the railways will be able to provide from year to year the improved and increasing service the public needs will depend on the wages they can pay to labor and the returns they can pay to capital, and these will depend on the rates they charge and the earnings they get.

There is another thing that is equally plain. This is that if employes are paid unreasonably high wages or capital is paid an unreasonable high return, freight and passenger rates will become too high, because the only source from which the railways can get money to pay for labor, capital or anything else is from the earnings derived from the rates paid by their patrons.

Now, when we consider all these plain and simple facts the answer to the question "What is the railroad problem?" becomes obvious. It is the problem of establishing such relations between the wages of the employes, the financial returns of the investors and the rates charged and the service rendered to travelers and shippers that each of these classes will get a "square deal" as compared with the other classes. You

cannot give to either of the classes directly concerned more than it is entitled to without giving to one or both of the others less than economic justice requires.

It is easy enough to thus state what the railroad problem is, and why it is what it is, in abstract terms. And I believe its constant restatement as a tripartite problem of the employes, the investors and the users of transportation service will help to promote its solution. But its solution always will be difficult. This is mainly because it will always involve a struggle between selfish interests who will, to a large extent, refuse to regard the problems from any standpoint except their own. To many railway employes the problem will always be merely that of getting wages. To many railway financiers and managers it will always be merely that of getting a larger net return. To many shippers and travelers it will always be merely that of getting better service and lower rates.

Now, if the Interstate Commerce Commission was a perfectly wise and fair body, and was free to do what it thought fair and wise regarding service, rates and financial return without outside interference, and if any other equally wise and fair body was free to exercise its fairness and wisdom in fixing wages, then there would be no difficulty about getting the railroad problem solved. Unfortunately we have no such wise, fair and free regulating bodies.

Many people believe the Interstate Commerce Commission is such a body, but it is influenced by public sentiment and the attitude of Congress, and there is never a session of Congress in which there are not introduced measures backed by classes or sections with great political influence that are intended to influence the decisions of the Commission or to so change the laws as to overrule decisions made by it in accordance with its expert knowledge and best judgment. Likewise, railway labor unions are unwilling to leave the settlement of disputes regarding the wages and working conditions of employes to any tribunal upon which the public is represented, but insist upon reserving the right to exert "economic pressure" in support of their claims by strikes and threats of strikes.

We cannot reasonably expect, therefore, ever to get a really satisfactory and permanent solution of our railroad problem.

We may at times establish relations between wages, rates and the net return earned which will be pronounced fair and equitable by well informed and reasonable men. But the equilibrium thus established will always be an unstable one. It will always be subject to disturbance by strong and effective demands for advances in wages, or reductions of rates, or increases in net return.

How can this equibrium between the interests and rights of the different parties concerned be even temporarily established? How can progress be made toward restoring it when it has been destroyed? There can be only one answer to that question. Constant efforts must be made to educate all parties concerned, first, so that they will know that the railroad problem is that of establishing fair relations between the wages of employes, the returns received by investors, and the rates paid by the public; secondly, so that they will know what the existing relations are between wages, net return and rates, and, third, so that they will realize that the establishment and maintenance of fair relations between these factors is essential to the public welfare and, therefore, to the welfare of all the parties that have a direct interest in the railroad problem.

It is a remarkable fact that we have been for years engaged in building up a comprehensive policy of railway regulation based on the belief that the transportation industry is mainly a non-competitive one, and that now transportation has become one of our most highly competitive industries.

Although their rates are fixed by federal and state commissions, there is active competition in freight and passenger service between the railways themselves. Within the last five years there has been a great increase in the number of ships operating through the Panama Canal in competition with the railways, and they have taken most of the freight business moving to and from the Pacific Coast. The railways encounter strong competition from ships on the Great Lakes and in our coastwise service; and we are in the midst of a powerful agitation for extensive development of inland waterways which also would compete with them.

The railways in every part of the country are feeling severely the competition of motor vehicles. Our governments

are expending approximately \$1,000,000,000 annually on hard surface highways. Within the last five years motor vehicles operating on these highways have taken from the railways about \$300,000,000 annually in passenger traffic, of which about \$150,000,000 has been lost by the western lines. Most of this business has been taken by private passenger automobiles, but in all parts of the country motor bus lines are being put in operation, and the railways are being threatened with almost a complete loss of their local passenger traffic.

The motor truck, also, has taken a great deal of local freight business, and is getting an increasing amount of it for hauls up to or even exceeding 100 miles.

To continue, in view of these facts, to regulate the rail-ways as if transportation was non-competitive would be an absurdity. Regulation should not ignore plain facts, but should be conducted in accordance with them. The result of so largely ignoring the plain facts thus far is that, while the service and rates of the railways are strictly regulated, those of water and motor carriers are not thus regulated, and in consequence a great deal of traffic which might be best handled by rail is being diverted to the waterways and highways.

There is only one fair and sound way to deal with this situation. This is to subject all classes of competing common carriers to similar kinds of taxation and regulation. The Panama Canal was built with public money. Why should American steamship lines which, like the railways, are privately owned, be given a monopoly of our coastwise traffic and in addition be allowed to use the canal without paying adequate tolls, to refrain from publishing their rates, to change them when they please, to charge one rate to one shipper and a much higher or lower rates to another shipper. while the competing railroads have their rates fixed by the Interstate Commerce Commission and are required to publish them and to make without discrimination the same rate to every shipper? Nothing could be plainer than that fairness and the public interest demand that the rates of steamship companies operating through the Panama Canal and elsewhere in our coastwise service shall be subjected to the same kind of regulation as those of the railways.

Again, why should people be allowed to engage in the

operation of motor buses or trucks as common carriers without being required to pay taxes in proportion to their use of the highways and without having their rates regulated and published as are those of the railways with which they enter into direct competition? In some states there is adequate taxation and regulation of highway common carriers, but in other states there is not and there is as yet no interstate regulation of them.

The aim of the Government should be to tax and regulate all classes of competing common carriers so that freight and passengers will be transported by rail, by water or by highway according to which form of service will be, under the conditions, the most economical in proportion to its value and convenience. It is contrary to the public interest to follow a policy of so subsidizing or refraining from regulating water or highway carriers as to enable them to take from the railways traffic which could be handled by railroad as well and at less total economic cost.

A majority of railway executives have agreed with the labor leaders in framing and supporting the Watson-Parker Bill, which will abolish the Labor Board and leave the settlement of labor controversies to direct negotiations or voluntary arbitration by the railways and the employes. In case a dispute cannot be settled by one of these means, the President of the United States, on the initiative of the Federal Mediation and Conciliation Board, may appoint a fact finding commission to pass upon the controversy.

The way any legislation for the settlement of railway labor controversies will work will depend mainly upon how representatives of the railways and the employes try to make it work. It is, however, an indisputable fact that labor leaders always have insisted and still insist, regardless of what legislation may be in effect or proposed, that they have a right to resort to strikes or threats of strikes to interrupt transportation in order to get what they demand.

No substantial general advance in wages could be made under present conditions without leading either to a disastrous reduction in the net return earned by the railways or to an advance in rates. In view of the important interest of the public in uninterrupted transportation and reasonable rates, railway employes and their leaders ought to accept the principle that all labor controversies on the railroads should be settled either by peaceable negotiations or by voluntary arbitration. In an industry such as railroad transportation, which renders an essential service and is subjected to detailed and comprehensive Government regulation, there can be no reasonable defense for the use of strikes or threats of strikes in labor controversies.

The project for solving the railroad problem by legislation to compel the consolidation of all the railways into a few huge systems, like most projects to solve it by revolutionary legislation, is adapted to arrest the progress now being made toward a solution.

It is argued in favor of this plan, which is embodied in a bill recently introduced by Senator Cummins of Iowa and endorsed by the Senate Committee on Interstate Commerce, that equalization of the net earnings of the railways through consolidations is necessary to enable the "weak" railways to continue to exist and render satisfactory service. During the last five years the railways of the country as a whole earned an average return of only 4 per cent on their property investment. The average earned by all the western railways was only  $3\frac{1}{2}$  per cent. This is the real reason why so many railways have been suffering from financial weakness. When the railways of each large territory as a whole are allowed to earn what the Interstate Commerce Commission has held to be a fair average return the problem of the weak roads will be largely solved without any revolutionary legislation.

The Senate Committee's report said it has been estimated that from \$300,000,000 to \$500,000,000 a year would be saved by consolidations, making practicable a corresponding reduction of freight and passenger rates. There is no basis of fact for any such large estimate. No doubt some savings would be made, but, as Chairman Eastman, speaking for a majority of the Interstate Commerce Commission, has said, "The country ought not to be led into the belief that great consolidations of railroad properties involve any probability that the general level of freight rates may thereby be substantially reduced."

The only wise policy regarding consolidations that Congress

could adopt would be to make them voluntary, subject to the approval of the Interstate Commerce Commission, and then let them be gradually carried out as railway managers and the Commission may agree will be fair to the owners of the railways and in the public interest.

During the last three years every form of progress toward a solution of the railroad problem that could be reasonably asked by any person who favors private ownership of railways has been made, and this is the first period of which this could be said since the adoption of effective federal regulation of railways when the Hepburn Rate Act went into effect just about twenty years ago. Interruption of this progress should not be threatened by drastic and compulsory consolidation legislation.

The progress that has been has been due to a better understanding of the railroad problem by the public, to more constructive regulation, and to better coöperation between the railways and the shipping public, on the one hand, and between the railways and their employes on the other hand.

Progress from the standpoint of the traveler and shipper consists in the improvement of transportation service or the reduction of rates. Railway patrons have been given both improved service and lower rates.

In the latter part of 1922 there was a huge car shortage because of the nation-wide shop employes' strike and of a large increase in freight traffic. Since then there have been no serious labor troubles and there has been an unprecedented increase in the efficiency of transportation service due mainly to the investment of \$3,000,000,000 of new capital in railway improvements and to close coöperation between the railways and the shippers through regional shippers' advisory boards.

In 1922 a general reduction of freight rates was made. Since then owing to constant downward readjustments rates have continued to decline. In consequence freight business was handled in 1925 for charges aggregating \$733,000,000 less than the shipping public would have had to pay at the rates in effect prior to the reduction in 1922.

Wages of railway employes also were reduced in 1922. Since then wages have been slowly but steadily advancing, and in 1925 aggregated \$100,000,000 more than they would have

at the average hourly wage of 1923, and \$40,000,000 more than they would have at the average hourly wage of 1922.

The years 1921 and 1922 were, in point of financial return, the worst in the history of our railways. The average return earned on their property investment in 1921 was only 2.9 per cent and in 1922 only 3.64 per cent. Furthermore, there was then a powerful agitation for radical legislation which would have put most of the railways into receivership or even forced them into Government ownership. Since then there has been a remarkable change in public sentiment and the wave of radicalism has subsided; the net return earned by the railways increased to 4.42 per cent in 1923, declined to 4.33 per cent in 1924 and increased in 1925 to 4.83 per cent.

These facts show that progress has been made by which the public, employes and the railways have benefited. The railways of the west as a whole are still earning a very inadequate net return, and are seeking an advance in freight rates, but the advance they are seeking would be only about onefourth as great as the reductions in their rates made in 1922 and since.

The railroad problem as it presents itself in the United States under our policy of regulation is almost unique. It is a problem that leaders of railway employes, railway managers, regulating authorities and the public must all cooperate in solving. It is still a serious question whether it actually can be solved under our peculiar policy of private ownership and management subject to such comprehensive and detailed regulation. It is certain that it cannot be solved under this policy unless through cooperation by all concerned due to an increasing willingness of each party to accord to the other parties concerned what they are entitled to.

There can be no question that within recent years all the parties concerned have got a better understanding of the problem, and that it is in consequence of this that real progress has been and is being made toward its solution. While we shall continue to have many struggles over the railroad problem. I confidently believe that this progress toward its solution

will continue.

## PSYCHOLOGICAL TECHNIQUE AND SOCIAL PROBLEMS

## MARTIN WHITE

University of Texas

The scientific attitude is essentially one of critical detach-It is easier for the tyro in physics, chemistry, or entomology to acquire such an attitude than it is for the beginner in psychology. The latter approaches his subject with more or less firmly entrenched conceptions and beliefs regarding human nature. Before he can progress to any appreciable extent in psychology he must divest himself of his existing prepossessions and learn to view his problems with the calm, dispassionate, questioning attitude so effectively employed in the physical sciences. Although the constituent items of this attitude are basically the same in all the sciences, the personal adjustments usually required for its development in the student of mental phenomena have given rise to a particular name for this scientific viewpoint when dealing with such phenomena. It is called the psychological attitude. In wrestling with social problems, problems involving the understanding, and the control of human conduct, the acquisition of the psychological attitude is of prime importance.

A little reflection will show the tremendous value of the possession of this attitude in the case of every serious endeavor to regulate or explain human conduct, whether it be that of enforcing child labor laws or ferreting out the motives of a Bismarck or a Clemenceau. This should be so patent as to require no further elaboration. However, the question might be asked: Are there any contributions, apart from the scientific attitude, that psychology may make to the investigations of social problems? Of greater, or at least of coördinate, importance is the contribution of specific psychological techniques. In this paper we shall be primarily concerned with a brief consideration of the possible applications of a few psychological methods to social problems.

Social problems involve human stimuli and human responses. The business of the psychologist is to study the precise relations between such stimuli and such responses. In

the course of his study he has developed a variety of instruments and methods of procedure to facilitate this work. By way of illustrating the possibilities of applying some of these experimental techniques to social problems we shall consider three of them. First, we shall discuss the nature and functions of the rating scale; secondly, the application of psychometric technique, and finally, the measurement of emotion by laboratory instruments.

In the process of selecting men for certain positions, it is frequently desirable to know not only the kind of traits the candidates possess, but also the amount of each trait. Likewise in choosing members for a lodge or a fraternity the question of the qualitative and quantitative aspects of the personality traits possessed by each prospective brother comes up for debate. It must be admitted, however, that nearly every person deludes himself and oftentimes others into thinking that he can "judge human nature" with serviceable accuracy. Experience ought to indicate the contrary; but we remember our "hits" and forget our "misses." A sad commentary on this pseudo-ability to judge human nature is the fact that every year thousands of individuals are employed as school teachers, factory workers, or office clerks, who must of necessity fail and either resign or be discharged, because someone thought he could "judge human nature."

Now what technique can the psychologist employ to increase the reliability of judgments of human character? First of all, his psychological training compels him to recognize the inadequacy of any method of judging character based on the principles of physiognomy, phrenology, palmistry, graphology, and kindred systems. He prefers more trustworthy, if less dramatic, methods. In the rating scale he has developed such a method. The rating scale represents a systematization and refinement of "common sense" estimates of ability and character. It originated in the American Army during the late war. Military officials often referred to it as the human yardstick. It calls for nothing more than a quantitative estimate of human traits.

At first sight, it may appear absurd to speak of a "quantitative estimate of human traits": to ask, does Mr. B. possess ten pounds, four gallons, or nine inches of tact? A little

<sup>1</sup>The Personnel System of United States Army, Vol. I, 1919.

consideration of the nature of measurements in general will serve to dispel the seeming absurdity of such a question.<sup>2</sup> In a measurement of any sort, that which is to be measured is compared with an arbitrary standard. A pound is a pound, simply because it corresponds in weight to an object kept by the Bureau of Standards the weight of which is designated as a pound. Similarly the rating scale necessitates the establishment of an arbitrary standard. The standard is that of particular individuals known to possess the traits to be measured. For example, army rating scales required the rater to select from his personal friends the individual who was the greatest leader, the one who was the worst leader, and three whose quantities of leadership lay equal steps apart between these two. By way of illustrating this aspect of the technique concretely, let us assume that the rater decided that Capt. X was the best leader among his friends and acquaintances, and that Capt. Z was the worst. He would then place Capt. X's name on the first line of the chart below; and Capt. Z's on the bottom line. On the third line he would place the name of the officer (Capt. Y) whom he considered half-way between Capt. X and Capt. Z so far as ability to lead was concerned. Next, the rater would select two officers to occupy positions 2 and 4 (Capt. A and Capt. B) in a similar fashion. As will be observed, each position on the scale is

Capt. X	
 Capt. A	
Capt. Y	and the first of the second second
 Capt. B	
 Capt. Z	

given a value in numerical units. This scale of positions and values is the rater's standard. He presumably knows all these officers intimately. He is now ready to measure or rate the various men concerning whom his judgment is required. He merely compares the person to be rated with each of the five men on his standard. The number opposite

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup>Griffitts, J. H., Fundamentals of Vocational Psychology, 1924.

the man's name on the standard whom the particular person most closely resembles is his rating. Thus if Lt. Brown resembles Capt. Y more than he does any of the other four he is given the number 9. The psychologist, however, is not content with a single rating so obtained. Experimental evidence proves that he must have at least three ratings, and preferably as many as five. Of course, the more raters up to a certain limit, the greater the accuracy. The final rating of the person is the combined or composite score of all the ratings.

Before any rating is made, however, the psychologist must discover the essential traits to be incorporated in the given scale. People should always be judged with reference to particular requirements. It would be useless to rate a black-smith on table manners, since table manners have nothing to do with his ability as a blacksmith. To determine what traits are essential for a blacksmith, the psychologist would first secure the opinion of many blacksmiths of proved competence. If, for example, a rating scale for school teachers were to be made, many hundreds of school teachers would be asked to list the traits indispensable for a school teacher's success. Those traits most frequently named would be regarded as the most essential and, consequently, would find a place on the scale.

The advantages of a rating scale over traditional methods of judging character may be suggested by a hasty survey of a few applications of such a scale. Let us revert to the problem of selecting lodge members or fraternity brothers. The group selects new individuals by a vote of the group. While all the members of the group may know the candidates, each candidate may not be known equally well. This one factor—length or intimacy of acquaintance—may decide who shall become a member and who shall not. It is obvious that the discrepancies in question may result in a loss not only to the organization but to the individuals themselves. By means of the rating scale this loss can be decidedly reduced.

There are two ways in which this reduction may be brought about. In the first place, the rating scale stresses the *relativity* of judgments. Ordinarily, the candidate is either "accepted" or "rejected." All candidates "rejected" are placed

in the same category. It is assumed, in other words, that they are all equally undesirable. Undoubtedly some of those rejected were nearly accepted; but, since the vote had to be either "yes" or "no," it was "no." The rating scale permits the introduction of gradations in judgments. Intermediate judgments can be given a hearing and the final decision of the group can be based on a composite rating. Such a procedure would enhance the chances of selecting the right individuals.

In the second place, the rating scale technique tends to eliminate distorted judgments based on either differences in length of acquaintance or mere "general" or "striking" impressions. The composite score already mentioned takes care of the former factor and the construction of the scale of the latter. In daily life we usually base our judgments on general impressions. We see a man eating peas with a knife or drinking coffee from a saucer and immediately feel justified in concluding that he is a man of low standards in "everything." We conveniently dispose of him as "no good." A student recites brilliantly in the Latin class. The chance auditor automatically infers that the student is "brilliant" in all of his studies. Such illegitimate generalizing tends to be warded off by the use of the rating scale which by its very nature compels the evaluation of separate traits and not of the personality as a whole. In addition it forces the judge to consider quantitative deviations in these traits both on the debit and credit side.

The introduction of rating scales by the army psychologists was followed by intensive study of the technique itself. As a result of this study numerous modifications have been introduced. Other types of rating scales have been developed. We are not concerned here with a discussion of these technical and historical details. Our purpose is, rather, to indicate that the method is fruitful and developing. By way of illustrating the rating scale technique itself more completely as well as to demonstrate one of the later modifications of the

method, the following instance is cited at this point. Fraternity X, consisting of about thirty members, wished to select

## Figure I GRAPHIC RATING SCALE

Please rate on the traits described below. Along the line beneath each trait, place a check at that point which, in your opinion, most accurately represents the amount of the trait possessed by this individual. The descriptions below the line are merely suggestive; your check may be placed at any point on the line which seems most accurately to represent your judgment. Rate the individual on each trait irrespective of your ratings on other traits. The traits may or may not be related. 1. Consider the individual's personality. How refined is she? How good are her manners? How orderly her conduct? How cultured is she?

Fairly refined At times slight- About like the and cultured ly unrefined average Uni-In most situa-Unmistakably tions well man-nered and reaverage Uni-versity girl

2. Consider her scholastic ability, defining it in terms of intelligence test scores and scholastic attainment. Base your estimate on ability rather than actual attainment.

Capable of B Far above av- Quick, accurate work. Energetic, studious erage but lack-thinker. Capable ing in traits of of A work A student Capable of C Slightly superior to the work. Energe average student ic, studious work Average

3. Consider her cooperativeness, with special reference to her willingness to aid her friends, and work with them in common tasks.

Wishes to work Often prefers to Fairly coöpera-alone work alone tive Willing to work Unusually coöp-together erative 4. Consider her family. What is its standing in its community?

A leader in the A member of Substantial, most desirable the most desir-high socially Slightly above average socially Recognized socially able group

5. Consider her physical attractiveness. Base your opinion on physical charm, gracefulness, poise, and good taste in clothing.

Well poised and graceful Exceedingly Graceful, Pleasing above Somewhat atcharming, good average attrac-taste tiveness graceful and tractive, emcharming characteristics

five members from among ten candidates. Ordinarily in such cases, a vote is taken and that settles the matter. The writer undertook to devise a rating scale to be used by the fraternity on the theory that the chances of securing the best five would be increased: (1) if it were known that each member considered those traits which the group as a whole regarded as essential in a good member, and (2) if each trait were evaluated in terms of continuous gradations. Accordingly, the rating scale in Figure I was devised. This scale is called a graphic rating scale. It differs from the army scale in that the traits are evaluated in linear and not numerical units. Of course the linear differences are later transformed into numerical terms. The five traits were selected and defined by the group. Perusal of the accompanying scale will furnish an adequate idea of the general method used. This scale is by no means ideal. It is intended to be merely suggestive of the technique and to indicate its superiority over the usual methods of selection.

In our endeavor to simplify the whole rating technique, we may have given a somewhat distorted picture of the matter. From the foregoing accounts the impression may have been given that to make reliable judgments concerning character traits, all that is necessary is to devise a rating scale, add up the total points, and read the result. Unfortunately the process is not quite so simple. Such a direct attack assumes that equal increments in each trait are equally important. More specifically it assumes that a person who scores ten on cooperativeness is twice as desirable or undesirable as the individual who scores five. Such an assumption demands analysis and justification. There are traits in which any additional increment does mean an equal increase in utility or desirability.3 On the other hand, so far as the value to the fraternity of the specific trait of cooperativeness is concerned, every person who scores over five may be equally desirable; that is, after it is ascertained that the individual possesses five units of coöperativeness, any additional increment will not affect the desirability of the person in question. Or it may be that any additional increment over five units may render the individual undesirable, although the possession of five units may make him desirable. This might be a case of virtue in excess. In other words, the possession of a given trait up to a certain amount might be desirable, while any additional increment

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>3</sup>Thorndike, Edwin L., "Fundamental Theorems in Judging Men." Journal of Applied Psychology, II, 67-76, 1918.

would be grounds for rejection. It may be that the possession of a trait up to five units does not affect the desirability of the candidate, but that the possession of five and one-fourth units makes him immediately eligible. The possession of six units of musical ability may represent the musical ability of the ordinary music teacher. An increment of one unit may transform the person into an opera star.

In making or using a rating scale it should be remembered that society puts different values on different amounts of the traits, and that not infrequently a very slight increment of the trait greatly changes the value attached to it. As an illustration of this point, let us consider the question of a person's height. For a dancer, a height of five feet is probably more desirable than a height of four feet; one of five and a half feet more desirable than one of five; but one of six feet six inches would be more undesirable than one of five feet eight inches. In other words, within a certain range, an additional increment in height is an advantage, but after a certain height is reached, it becomes distinctly a disadvantage. If, however, the value which the group places on a given trait and different increments of that trait be ascertained and embodied in the scale, the pitfalls involved will be avoided.

A social problem more important than any considered thus far is the proper selection of judges to preside over our courts. The traits of a good judge are describable in quantitative terms, and, among lawyers, one will find general agreement as to the nature of the ideal judicial traits. A method, such as the rating technique, could easily be employed to facilitate the selection of judges. The different traits could be isolated. defined and rated. Since all the judges in the higher courts are lawyers, bar associations could qualify for this task. To permit the farmers, physicians, business men and other citizens devoid of legal training to select our judicial officers is another example of the inefficiency of democracy. The voting public cannot consider the various isolated qualities constituting a fair-minded, capable judge. They can only cast their votes, based, at best, on a general impression. Lawyers are far better qualified than the general public to consider the essential qualities of a good judge. By introducing the rating technique the ideal judge could not, of course, be guaranteed. but the chances of obtaining him would assuredly be increased.

Not only is this technique applicable to the selection of judges, but also to the selection of city managers and other public officials. The rating scale would give the commissioner or alderman something concrete and objective with which to work. Its use might also have some educational value for the city elders; it would aid them in seeing managers in terms of concrete situations and specific qualities, not in term of vague generalities.

Nothing is more ridiculous than the faith which the average city alderman or school trustee places in the general terms comprising the items of written recommendations or conventional character estimates. For instance, a school trustee will ask the superintendent: "Does Miss Gray take much interest in her pupils?" Without a definition of interest in terms of concrete situations, how can anyone be certain that the word conveys the same impression to two people? To the school trustee, it may mean staying after 3 o'clock and helping the children with their lessons; to the superintendent, it may mean finding out why children are absent or tardy; to another, it may mean playing with the children at recess; or teaching a Sunday School class or preparing entertaining lessons. Does the school trustee have all of these meanings in mind when he asks such a question? If so, does the school superintendent consider all of them in his reply? An appropriate rating scale would tend to insure such complete consideration.

The salient characteristics of the rating scale technique should now be clear. We have made several suggestions concerning the utilization of this technique in coping with social problems. Additional suggestions will occur to the thoughtful individual who has grasped the basic nature and purpose of the technique. One further fact should be stressed in this connection; namely, that the psychologist uses the rating scale only when more direct measuring devices cannot be employed. If he can use one of the psychometric methods—the testing technique—he prefers it to the rating scale.

Although the technique of testing and of rating are different, they nevertheless possess characteristics in common. Whether we rate or measure broad-mindedness, it is necessary to define it in terms of concrete situations. Both methods require experimental confirmation before the psychologist can use them. It is as a result of the attempts to verify his con-

clusions experimentally that the psychologist has noted certain shortcomings of the rating scale. It does not satisfy to the fullest degree the three cardinal principles of measurement: reliability, validity, and objectivity. Reliability in this connection, means giving the same result on the same problem each time a measurement is made. The validity of an instrument refers to the degree of relationship existing between its results and some other independent measure of the same phenomenon. A measuring instrument or test is said to be objective if it produces the same result in the hands of different experts. Thus the thermometer is objective, because all people obtain the same result, more or less, in observing it. Incidentally there is no psychological instrument, nor any other scientific instrument, which absolutely satisfies any of these three principles. A pragmatic ideal is all that the investigator strives to attain.

Because of its limitations in meeting these three requirements the psychologist employs the rating scale only in cases where no other instrument is available. It should be emphasized, however, that despite these limitations the rating scale is many more times reliable, more objective and more valid than any ordinary method of selecting men, such as personal recommendations, letters of application, photographs, or "professional" character analyses.

Contrary to popular opinion, psychological tests are not limited to intelligence or mental alertness tests. In fact there are many kinds of psychological tests besides intelligence tests. For present purposes, however, we are less concerned with the varieties of tests than with the technique used in constructing such tests and their applicability to social problems.

Psychological tests are generally developed by one of four methods: (1) the method of sample performance; (2) the method of vocational miniature; (3) the method of analogy; and (4) the method of empirical procedure. The method of sample performance may be illustrated by the truck driver's tests as developed by the army psychologists. The duties of a truck driver, more particularly those of an army truck driver, were first carefully analyzed. A sample of each duty was

Laird, D. A., Psychology of Selecting Men, 1925.

Scott, W. D., and Clothier, R. C., Personnel Management, 1923.

<sup>6</sup>Hollingworth, H. L., Vocational Psychology, 1919.

selected and the recruit's skill in executing the given sample actually tested. If he received a passing score he was detailed to that service.

The method of vocational miniature is best exemplified by Münsterberg's<sup>7</sup> experiment with telephone operators. Münsterberg constructed a test intended to predict the success of prospective telephone switchboard operators. To do this he built a typical but miniature telephone switchboard. His purpose in making it in miniature was to render the switchboard easily portable, less expensive, and somewhat simpler to operate. Those apprentices who could perform most accurately and quickly the typical movements of an operator were selected as the ones who could probably achieve the greatest success.

The method of analogy has not been as successful as some of the other methods. The difficulties in its use are nearly insurmountable. According to this method, a particular task, which has some real or fancied resemblance to the trait to be measured is used as the basis of the test. For example, a railroad engineer must distinguish quickly between red and green lights; therefore, administer to him a test wherein he is required to press one key if a red light appears and another if the light is green. The person who can do this most efficiently, other things being equal, is presumed to give promise of developing the requisite skill demanded of successful engineers.

The fourth method, that of empirical procedure, seems the most fruitful at present. Any task is taken as the basis for the test and the coefficient of correlation is obtained between the performance of the task and the trait to be measured. The psychologist may be assigned the task of constructing a predictive test of typing ability. He may plunge into his work by "guessing" that there may be a relation between typing ability and the following tasks: (1) ability to cross out certain letters of the alphabet; (2) ability to decipher a code; (3) ability to perceive small differences in rhythm. To verify his "guesses" he proceeds to devise tests for all of these tasks. For the first he might have the applicants cancel specific letters in a large group of letters arranged in random order; for the

Münsterberg, Hugo, Psychology and Industrial Efficiency, 1913.

second, a simple adaptation of the Morse code might be utilized; and for the third, he might employ a standard rhythm test such as that of Professor Seashore's.

These tests would then be administered to all sorts of typists -poor, medium, and excellent. Suppose he administers the tests to 300 typists chosen at random. If an analysis of the results indicates that only the excellent typists-say those writing at least seventy words a minute-made high scores on the alphabet test, and only the medium typists made medium scores, and so forth, this test would then be accepted as one of the battery of tests finally to be selected. To the extent that this hierarchal and parallel arrangement is found to prevail in the other tests, they too are presumed to be of diagnostic worth. Having weeded out the promising from the unpromising tests by this means, he then administers the surviving tests to a group of beginners in typing. When these individuals finish their course in typing, he measures the relationship between the battery of tests and their final typing skill. If it is discovered that those who made the highest test scores, and only those, are the most skilled typists, and so on down to the least skilled typist, the test is accepted as prognostic of typing success. Naturally there are a multitude of other details involved in this empirical method, but this rough sketch must suffice to give a general picture of its nature.

How can psychometric methods be applied to the solution of social problems? It is to be noticed, first of all, that no relationship between the test task and the trait to be measured is assumed. The relationship is determined by straight forward empirical investigation. It is not a matter of a priori guesswork. In this connection we suggest that the development and application of such an empirical test for use by our immigration officials would be far superior to any method that the United States now employs. It is ordinarily assumed, quite arbitrarily, that all Chinese should be barred from American citizenship. It is altogether likely that some Chinese might become better American citizens than some Englishmen. The present method of selecting immigrants ignores almost entirely the fundamental truth that individuals differ and that they cannot be grouped into types. The individual differences among the English as a group are very likely greater and more profound than the differences between the Chinese and the English. To handle the immigration problem in a more intelligent fashion, it might be well, therefore, to define (in terms of definite, concrete situations) those traits which are most desirable in American citizens and to construct and administer tests that will serve to differentiate the potential Edward W. Boks from the potential Jukes.

The objection might be made that we are letting our psychological imagination run riot and that we are far from the realization of such a possibility. This possibility, however, is not altogether chimerical. Very recently Dr. Goodwin B. Watson<sup>8</sup> developed a test which purports to measure fairmindedness or prejudice. He defines prejudice as follows: "any tendencies, however produced (a) to cross out as distasteful terms which represent one side or another of religious or economic controversies; (b) to call sincere and competent persons who hold different opinions on religious and economic issues incompetent or insincere; (c) to draw from given evidence conclusions which support one's bias but which are not justified by that evidence; (d) to condemn in a group which is disliked activities which would be condoned or approved in some other group; (e) to regard arguments, some of which are really strong and others which are really weak, as all strong if they be in accord with subject's bias, or all weak if they run counter to that bias; and (f) to attribute to all people or objects in a group characteristics which belong to only a portion of that group." It would lead us too far afield to give a concrete example of each of Watson's five tests. We shall, therefore, confine our illustrations to Tests B and D. Watson measures the former by fifty-three statements of the following type:

"The churches are more sympathetic with capital than with labor.

(2)—So true that no one with a fair understanding of the subject could sincerely and honestly believe it false.

(1)—Probably true, or true in a large degree.

(0)-Uncertain, or doubtful.

(-1)-Probably false, or false in a large degree.

(-2)—So false that no one with a fair understanding of the subject could sincerely and honestly believe it true."9

The person taking the test is required to check the particular statement which he deems most nearly correct. The mark-

<sup>8</sup>Watson, Goodwin B., The Measurement of Fair-Mindedness, p. 8, 1925.

edly prejudiced person would check either the first or last statement as indicated by the scores in the parentheses.

Watson measured that part of prejudice indicated in Part D of his definition as follows: "Each instance in the test is parallel to one or two other instances in the type of situation it present. Thus 'faith cures' are presented once through the medium of a Japanese idol, once at a Roman Catholic shrine, and once under the leadership of a protestant evangelist. . . . These instances are, of course, scattered through the test so as to conceal as far as possible the parallelism. It matters not, for the purpose of the test, whether the subject shall approve, be indifferent to, or disapprove, the action in any situation, if only he will be consistent in the parallel act under slightly different circumstances." From the psychological standpoint such a test would come nearer indicating the "broad-mindedness" of an individual in the fields tested than would an appeal to personal opinion.

There have been similar tests developed to measure other constituents of personality. Kohs<sup>11</sup> has published an ethical discrimination test. In this test, the individual is asked to indicate what he would do with people who committed certain acts, some of which meet with society's approval, while others meet with its disapproval. The score represents the amount of agreement with what the majority of people think should be done. Miss Downey<sup>12</sup> has developed a test which attempts to measure a variety of volitional traits. Moore<sup>13</sup> has devised a method of measuring the trait of aggressiveness.

Regardless of how men are selected, they must always be selected for a particular purpose and for that purpose certain traits are more important than others. A test, if rightly developed, can best indicate the amount of those traits. Such tests as Watson's and Koh's, if they be valid, would be of service in dealing with such diverse problems as selecting an

<sup>9</sup>Watson, op. cit., p. 9.

<sup>10</sup> Watson, op. cit., p. 10.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>11</sup>Kohs, S. C., "An Ethical Discrimination Test," Journal of Delinquency, VIII, 1-15, 1922.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>12</sup>Downey, J. E., "The Will-Profile," University of Wyoming Bulletin, XVI, No. 4b, 1919.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>18</sup>Moore, H. T., and Gilliland, A. R., "The Measurement of Aggressiveness," Journal of Applied Psychology, V, 97-118, 1921.

ambassador to England or determining criminal responsibility. They are serviceable because they take into consideration the fact not only that individuals differ, but that they differ quantitatively. They are based on the practically established fact that people cannot be grouped into "types." They substitute measurement for guesswork.

In addition to the rating scale and testing techniques, psychology can be of service in the solution of social problems in at least one other way: the measurement of emotions. It is frequently important to determine whether or not a witness is telling the truth. It is often a problem of great concern to determine a person's emotional instability. Healy has used such methods to a great advantage in dealing with abnormal children in juvenile courts. In selecting men to fill such places as taxicab drivers, policemen, and army officials a measure of the individual's emotional stability is desirous. The psychologist has developed several methods of detecting emotion. Generally he makes use of some of the following: a free association method, 14 blood pressure records, 15 breathing records, 16 psychogalvanic reflex, 17 and blood volume records. 18 Lack of space forbids a detailed consideration of these various devices. Suffice it to say, therefore, that they have been successfully used by numerous investigators, among whom may be mentioned, Marston, 10 Larson, 20 Benussi, 21 and Münsterberg.22

Psychology is thus seen to be a fertile field for the investigator and administrator of social affairs. It can furnish a

<sup>14</sup>Jung, C., Studies in Word Association, 1916.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>15</sup>Marston, W. M., "Reaction-time Symptoms of Deception," Journal of Experimental Psychology, 2:2:117-163, 1917.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>16</sup>Burtt, H. E., "The Inspiration-Expiration Ratio during Truth and Falsehood," Journal of Experimental Psychology, 4:1:1-23, 1921.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>17</sup>Smith, W. W., The Measurement of Emotion, 1923.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>18</sup>Angell, J. R., and McLennan, S. F., "The Organic Effects of Agreeable and Disagreeable Stimuli," Psy. Rev. III, 370-383.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>10</sup>Larson, J. A., "The Cardiac-Pneumo-Psychogram in Deception," Journal of Experimental Psychology, 1924, 6:420-454.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>20</sup>Benussi H., Archiv fur die Gesampte Psychologie, 1914, 31, pp. 244-271.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>21</sup>Münsterberg, Hugo, On the Witness Stand. 1914.

variety of technical devices that can be of service in the solution of many social problems. When such psychological techniques as the rating scale, psychometric tests, apparatus for measuring emotionality and many others that could not be discussed in this paper are introduced into the realm of social problems, their complexities may conceivably be reduced and their solutions possibly brought nearer.

## MANAGED CURRENCIES\*

M. K. GRAHAM Graham, Texas

When gold was first used as money and for tens of centuries thereafter, it functioned without the aid of law. This was because gold was merely one of the wheels of the business machine and the machine itself needs no law to function. Both business and gold need law only to make them function fairly.

Gold was first the medium of exchange and store of value. When debts entered, gold automatically became the standard of value. Gold has always been a good medium of exchange but a poor standard of value—the best that man could find until recently, but poor at that.

This is really not surprising when we remember that a scientific standard of value is necessarily an abstraction and that only during the past few years has man made progress in solving far simpler concrete problems. How differently men view abstractions was illustrated only a year ago at the annual banquet of our parent association when the editor of *The London Economist*, while praising the old gold standard, at some length characterized all modern monetary reforms as "bunk" and thereby elicited applause. He went on to say that history showed all managed currencise to have been failures. And yet, while he was thus condemning all managed currencies, Mr. McKenna and the other British bankers were, probably even then, preparing their addresses to their stockholders wherein they show that all currencies are now managed currencies and must continue to be such.

Economic theories, including those about the gold standard, should never become static. Business practices continually change under the guidance of enlightened selfishness. The practices of today are not those of yesterday. The period since 1914 has passed in review before us what would otherwise have required generations to unfold, and its rapidly moving panorama has enabled us to get a close-up view that our

<sup>\*</sup>Paper read at the seventh annual meeting of the Southwestern Political and Social Science Association.

predecessors were unable to get. They often forgot the beginning before the end came. The years 1920-21 and 1923-26 have been even more fruitful than were the years of war: the former because cures are eagerly sought only during illness; the latter because radicalism sleeps during prosperity. We are thus now enabled to analyze our prosperity and to formulate its theory.

The war years more than halved the value of the dollar; 1920–21 added 75 per cent to its value. Together these periods demonstrated the crudity, the unfairness, even the dangers of an improperly managed gold-standard currency and the practical impossibility of a gold currency not managed at all. Certainly, now that they know better, men cannot leave their standard of value to the haphazard discovery and mining of gold and to the reckless and irresponsible issue of deposit currency based upon gold. These periods also seem to have taught us the chief causes of the business cycle; and the period 1923–26 may have taught us how to smooth out its extremes.

We now begin to see that our modern conception of saving, under a money régime, had become miserliness. We have been, and may yet be, a nation of modern misers. The hated miser of old hoarded gold: too many of us have been hoarding notes and bonds. This view is not wholly orthodox, nor is it radical when understood. One has but to read Foster and Catching's *Profits* and I Timothy 6:6–19, (in fact any biblical teaching on the subject of money) to appreciate the view here expressed—that of moderation. Suppose every one tried to invest all of his savings in bonds and notes, what would result? Certainly, a nation of misers, with all that this implies.

We seem to be learning that our savings should be largely in goods and that money and savings must finance consumption as well as production and distribution. Both capital and labor are learning that greater efficiency and lower costs result in higher wages and shorter hours, and that these lead on to leisure, education, health, longevity—in short, to happiness.

Of course we have not learned all there is to know about these problems and perhaps we shall never be able to apply our knowledge unerringly. While all of these factors are contributing causes of continuing prosperity, its one essential condition is a reasonably steady price level—that is, a stable standard of value. With the latter, continued prosperity may be possible; without, it will be impossible. Before considering our present standard, let us brifly trace its evolution.

While there has long been mistrust of metallic standards, the first tangible manifestation of this mistrust appeared about a century back with the development of the Tabular Standard Theory. This theory comprehended the first vague conception of index numbers of prices and of a scientific standard of value. The plan was to select a bill of the goods used in daily life, the quantity and quality of each being rigorously defined. The bill of goods as drawn was to be such that it could be bought at that time for 100 in the wholesale markets. Accordingly, one pound was to have been 1/100 of the bill. It was foreseen that in redemption of this currency the holder might not desire all or any of the items on the bill, hence, the currency was to be redeemed on the basis of enough gold to buy the equivalent goods. Thus the pound would always buy the same quantity of goods, though its weight in gold might vary.

Few men, however, could understand that to fix the price of all of the goods selected need not fix the price of any one of them. Even then they knew that to fix the price of any single commodity interfered with supply and demand and with the price structure; and by reason of this, they thought that the price of all could be fixed no more safely. Many laymen are yet under this impression. Indeed comparatively few know that the dollar has always varied in value; that the \$1.60 wheat now is the equivalent of the \$1 wheat of 1913, or that the present 20-cent cotton corresponds to the  $12\frac{1}{2}$ -cent cotton of 1913.

Seventy years passed characterized by business cycles and panics before Professor Fisher in the 1890's dug up the old Tabular Standard Theory, improved it, and gave it again to the world as the Goods-dollar Plan. He began to preach the doctrine of a fixed value of gold in the dollar rather than a fixed weight. He has been at this ever since.

His Goods-dollar Plan is quite simple. Surprising as it sounds, after all the clamor about it, its adoption would require few changes in the law. Its price level would be the price level at the time of its adoption. It would take over, almost bodily, our present currency system including its deposit currency. All gold coins would then be retired and no more

minted; and the gold dollars would then, if necessary, vary in weight instead of value, at bi-monthly intervals. Its ruling thought is that we should have a fairly stable standard of value, as we now have exact standards of weight.

No one, not even Professor Fisher, I think, advocates the adoption, at this time, of the Goods-dollar Plan. He seems to be self-satisfied with present conditions; and he is now quietly perfecting index numbers of prices, on which his Goods-dollar is based. So while the Goods-dollar Plan is not now a live issue, it must not be forgotten. Its theory should be perfected, ready for use if needed.

I formerly thought that those in charge of our monetary system, especially the commercial bankers, realized the evils of unstable money and the virtues of a stable standard of value but refused to advocate stabilization because they preferred to manipulate the value of the dollar selfishly in their own interests. I have later come to believe that this is not true; that they did vaguely see the evils but that they preferred stable exchanges to stable dollars. Moreover, business is loath to experiment in a large way. Practices usually preceds laws. The system worked fairly well and the need did not seem sufficiently urgent for them to experiment.

Only of late has the business world come to see the virtues, even the necessity, of stability. Through vision or accident, those in charge have found out that they can take a short cut to accomplish stabilization. Somehow, they discovered that by the simple expedient of holding the price level steady, there would be no need to vary the weight of the dollar. This new dollar we may call the present stabilized gold standard dollar; and this we enjoy by no legal action or sanction.

When this stabilized gold standard finally became clear to me (and I must admit that it took me a long time to see it) I thought that I had reached my goal; that no longer would I have to be peculiar, an outcast from the conservative ranks. I thought that by this simple expedient our dollar could always be stabilized. And so it can be, as long as other major nations on a gold basis shall hold their price levels at about the same level as ours. Should they direct or permit theirs to fall too far below ours, we should then lose our gold to them and we would have to choose between stable dollars and stable exchanges. In such event, should we select the stable dollars,

we could then choose between a free paper currency or the Goods-dollar Plan. The latter seems preferable because of its gold base.

Of course the probability of foreign price levels falling below ours in the near future is slight since these nations are now debtor nations. So long as they continue such they will have no incentive to lower world price levels, and thereby their real debts. This squarely raises the issues of controlled price levels or managed currencies about which there is yet some controversy.

Those who believe in the quantity theory of money need no other proof that price levels can, theoretically at least, be controlled. Those who do not, should read Kemmerer's *Modern Currency Reforms*, written before the war, wherein he clearly shows how four minor currencies were altered in value at will and were stabilized on a gold basis by strict regulation of their volume and management of their gold. The quantity theory is not mentioned therein.

England is the mother of the gold standard as well as of its management by credit control. Because of proper credit control, she has had no panics since 1844. The British commercial bankers, January, 1925, showed how "on the basis of official index numbers, the price level in England had been more stable during the previous three years than in the United States" by reason of the better management of the sovereign; and they conceded that some control must continue after their return to the gold standard. How to control credit is also controversial, but that is beyond the purview of this paper. Cassell in his "Money and Foreign Exchange After 1914" fully demonstrates all phases of actual currency management, including currencies on a gold basis.

Our own law providing for minimum bank reserves is a crude attempt to manage the value of gold; and the control of the discount rate by our Federal Reserve Board works to the same end. As well believe that the *Leviathan* directs her own course from port to port without human guidance as to believe that our dollar on a pre-war basis has held steady of its own accord at near 63 cents during the past year. Without management, it might easily have fallen to its 40-cent value of 1920.

The recent rise of the New York rate from 3½ per cent to 4 per cent was solely for the purpose of control. This was

done at a time when the combined reserves had just risen from 70 per cent to 72 per cent, and they were even this low because millions of lawful money had been previously and purposely put into circulation.

What is controlled inflation or deflation but currency management? He who believes that gold currencies are not being managed should remember that there is much more monetary gold in the world now than ever before, and that this stock is being augmented annually by about \$400,000,000. He should realize that this gold circulates but little anywhere, that it is largely being used as the basis of deposit currency, and that there is really too much of it for this purpose alone. He must see that it is no longer a question of whether all currencies, including those on a gold basis shall be managed, but, rather, how and by whom they shall be managed. Certainly he has not kept abreast of the times who now believes that the value of gold is not an artificial, managed value.

At what level prices should be stabilized has become rather an academic question. England managed her prices downward in 1924–25 and we managed ours upward, until they met in April, 1925, at their present level, thus enabling England to return to a gold parity. The question was thereby answered. Personally, I do not doubt that England would now like to see a gentle advance in price. Where this managed value shall quietly be steered to, is in the hands of the powers that be. Their present policy seems to be to hold it steady. This they should adhere to, since the hardships of previous changes have been wrought; and the chief aim in any plot should be stability.

American people and their lawmakers resent control, no matter how beneficent it may be. So, until business men and the general public shall know more about price levels and standards of value, those in control will probably continue to be reticent as to how this is being done, or, in fact, as to whether or not it is being done. One must shudder to think of what would have happened since 1914 without our Federal Reserve System and the control it has assumed and exercised. Believing as I do, I should regret any limitation of its present power other than to legalize and direct it to the end that all might know what to expect and that its continued right use would be assured under changing administrations.

To summarize with the words of Sir Josiah Stamp: "The gold standard is the best that this age knows, or is capable of using, but it is not really, unaided, much for civilization to boast of, and our aims ought to be to improve it in every conceivable way. Whatever may be said about the difficulties of a managed currency compared with a gold standard, we can at least say this, that no gold standard is really possible in these days unless it is a managed gold standard; and we see the management of the gold standard by means of changes in the bank rates for money. The stabilized gold standard will probably serve our needs for years to come. But should we disagree with foreign nations and elect to maintain stable dollars rather than stable exchanges, the Goods-dollar Plan may then be needed. All currencies are now managed currencies, the present problem being how and by whom they shall be managed. The dollar now seems to be stabilized at a value of about 63 cents, 1913 basis.

## BOOK REVIEWS

EDITED BY B. F. WRIGHT, JR.

University of Texas

THE TWO AUSTINS

Barker, Eugene C. The Life of Stephen F. Austin. (Nashville and Dallas: Cokesbury Press, 1926, pp. vi, 551.)

Until the Austin Papers are published complete, and the Williams Papers, the Archives of Bexar and Nacogdoches, the records in Saltillo and Mexico City and elsewhere in the Mexican Republic; in fact, until all the vast body of documents listed in the chapter of bibliography in the life of Austin, is handily available to the ordinary historian, professional or amateur, there is not much sense in attempting a criticism of Professor Barker's book by anyone but himself. No one, living or dead, has read all these records—except Professor Barker. As none of us, alive or dead, will ever do it, a dead silence among us critics were best; but the various Texas journals for serious discussion require reviews of so significant a volume as Professor Barker's "Life"; and one of them, this Journal, has corralled the present scribe.

And yet it is a great pity that there is no one else so fully qualified to discuss Stephen F. Austin as Professor Barker. Then, a profound difference in opinion would not be complicated by differences in scholarship. But for an amateur historian to contradict a professed historian in the one great specialty of his whole professional career, is full cause for laughter; yet that is just the thing this writer must do to clear his conscience historically. There is no escape for him from wide disagreement with Professor Barker and his University associates concerning Stephen F. Austin. It is hard because for just ten years Professor Barker has cordially assisted and encouraged the writer in his own delving for the hidden facts of the Texas Revolution.

If this were a criticism of doubtful facts or theories of physical science, there would be no difficulty. A dozen specialists throughout the world would test facts and theories exhaustively, and calmly publish their findings. A second, third, or fourth article from the original investigator would modify or restate the original facts and theories. But in Texas history only two works, Kennedy's and Yoakum's, have been reprinted, and these, of course, unchanged. Let us hope Professor Barker's "Life" may reach many editions, so that after hearing all we assailants say, and after hearing those who agree with him, and after hearing his own further criticism and comments, he may at his pleasure re-state or modify his statements of fact, or his judgments. But all the other Texas historians have had but the one chance. Truth and error alike still stand unchanged in their volumes.

The writer admits he has always disliked Stephen F. Austin. The reason can be plainly stated: for all intents and purposes Austin was a secular Jesuit. To this writer, any means seemed to Austin justified by his great purpose. The fact that his means contributed to a great and good end, the settlement of Texas, should not blind us to their

equivocal character. Of course, no one could claim that Austin gratuitously used doubtful means for the mere pleasure of it. It is perfectly true that wherever straight-forward means could be used best for his ends, Austin used them. But, in the dilemmas often before him, he had to choose either the abandonment of his enterprise, or the use of doubtful means. And in these cases, he used the doubtful means. Now we Texans, as beneficiaries of his deeds, have a choice, as all generations in the world have had and will have a like choice: either to accept Austin's means as good because the end sought was good; or to accept the end as we do all our heritages from previous generations, as inevitably ours, yet condemn Austin's means whenever and wherever doubtful, not merely for our own clear conscience, but that the minds of our own time, and mayhap, future times, may clear themselves also.

The appearance of Professor Barker's Life of Austin was welcomed indeed, not only for itself, the monumental achievement of a great historical scholar, but for the hope that it would refute all our accusations against Austin himself. And this it has done, and has not done. Many of the charges he has refuted, some stand modified; but many new charges are reluctantly added by Professor Barker himself; while many more which to this writer seem to need extended refutation are not mentioned at all in the "Life of Austin."

But there are new incidents and new virtues of Austin listed in the "Life" which profoundly modify our conception of Austin. Until it appeared, all the writer's historical reading confirmed the judgment early made, that Austin had none of the feelings or judgments of modern civilized men; that he was governed only by his own interest or the interest of his colonies; that distinterested action having in view the large ultimate good of mankind as a whole, was foreign to his nature.

So the title of this article, "The Two Austins," seems now the best expression of the views of the writer. There was the lower Austin the Austin of sharp practice and ready bootlegging subterfuges to avoid the Mexican slavery laws; the grasping Austin of the Robertson Colony Controversy; the subtle Austin attempting to bribe "the boss," Teran; the tortuous Austin in Mexico City, whose one real impulsive act, the letter to the San Antonio authorities, gave that old inflexible Mexican patriot, Gomez Farias, a long-wanted opportunity of punishment for old scores.

But there was the higher Austin, the Austin who stayed on when his hope of a splendid fortune disappeared with Saucedo's annulment of the land fees; and the Austin, who, under the influence of a fine woman, his cousin, Mrs. Holley, came to look with horror at the possibilities to Texas from his own previous activity in making his colonies slave territory; and the Austin of ready service in any capacity his countrymen chose for him: the last journey to Mexico, the mission to the United States, and his death-service as Secretary of State of the infant republic.

After all what is this lower and higher Austin but the dual character of us all? The excuse for our expressing so obvious a platitude about Austin is just this, that state pride and local piety have selected Austin, with Sam Houston, as the great man for emulation by the youth

of Texas, and consequently, like George Washington, he is in near likelihood of becoming a lay figure, whose every impulse was good, and whose every action was perfect.

But Barker's "Life of Austin" is more than this. While, strange to say, no other Texan than Austin stands out clearly defined in it, several Mexican statesmen assume living reality by this book; that is, Saucedo, Teran, and Gomez Farias. And it is in contrast to Austin's that their actions commend themselves to this writer. It is 100 years since they had their day, yet no Texas historian until professor Barker has ever given them a fair word. Teran particularly has suffered; yet so far as this writer has read, he was a true gentleman and a true Mexican patriot. He was a Centralist, to be sure, a word to Texans and Southerners always denoting evil. But to Latin-Americans, it by no means stood for evil; the great Simon Bolivar was a Centralist.

The writer now reaches his main criticism. Always, the biographical approach to history in subversive of truthful relations of facts. It is an artistic method, in which esthetic considerations must over-fashion the facts. There must be a hero, just as in a novel or in a play. By its very nature, biography must exclude relevant events and persons; and extend, even distend, minor particulars connected with its central figure; in short, there is a necessary mis-relation of facts. Professor Barker has realized this. The "Life of Austin" is scientific in its full and careful statement of the facts chosen to be stated; and in its minute references to chapter or page of authorities; but all the facts are not stated, either as refuted or sustained. Natural answers come to mind: need for brevity and readability. Esthetic answers! In short, Professor Barker tells the truth, and nothing but the truth, but he does not tell all the truth. It is the besetting sin of biography. The artistic necessities, brevity, clearness, readability, excuse the exclusion of facts that would mar the biographer's conception of his hero, under the plea that the said facts are exceptional, not typical. Thus, Professor Barker has left out of consideration, matters that must seem of small importance to him, but which to this writer are extremely pertinent. There is the story in The Lamar Papers, how Austin used his brother's name to enter tracts of land, and how Brown Austin's widow, as Mrs. Hill, beat the other Austin heirs in the courts. There is the proclamation of Austin to the Cherokees during the Fredonian affair that he would see that they got their lands; yet they never got them, and there is no record known to the writer that he ever really tried to help them. The story of the Robertson Colony Controversy is left incomplete. One would infer that the upholding of Austin and Williams by the second set of rascals at Monclova settled matters. But did it? It seems to this writer's recollection that all Robertson's settler finally got land in Robertson's colony, and from Robertson, by will of the people of Texas in convention or congress assembled. This would seem more important than that the courts twenty years later upheld the rascality of Williams in selling large tracts to speculators. And that omitted first reply of Austin to Williams, where Austin tells Williams a thing or two in bitter words, would be worth a dozen of the letter quoted. Surely, it was the

heart-cry of a broken man, who knew he was broken, and who knew who broke him—Sam Williams.

But the whole of this criticism can be stated in few words. The "Life of Austin" by Professor Barker is a labor of love. That is its great virtue and its great defect.

SAMUEL E. ASBURY.

Wilder, H. H., The Pedigree of the Human Race. (New York: Henry Holt & Co., 1926.)

This is the work that all teachers of Anthropolgy have been wanting for years and that none of them had dared to write. It comes from the ven of a zoologist whose first attempt to write a didactic book on anthropological matters has not been especially successful. To write on such a subject as the pedigree of the human race is such a far reaching task and it requires such an abundant and varied knowledge that the only possible book on it will have to be in the form of a symposium.

Wilder's book is commendable in different ways. His division in chapters is good, his knowledge of zoology has enabled him to handle the first part in a rather satisfactory, although too detailed way. It has a good number of illustrations of which some are very good. I also like his discussions of the race (p. 279), and his description of the hand and foot of the primates,—a subject that is quite familiar to him. Unprejudiced anthropologists will partake of his opinion as to what America may have in store for the future with regard to fossil man (p. 164).

My objections to this new book will have to do with its lack of system, its wanting information, and its weak or inaccurate handling of some subjects.

....Speaking of system, I do not believe that the reader could reach a clear conception of what *Pithecanthropus* or the Neaendertal species of man, were through his trying to understand the confusing description the author gives of them. Wilder has a peculiar sense of the relative importance of facts and of what logical discussion requires. Why is the Neandertal man discussed before the Mauer one? What has the Unterseeve skull (p. 171) to do with fossii man since it is "evidently neolithic", and why does the author describe it in so much detail, notwithstanding its lack of relation to the subject and its insignificance, if it is not simply that it was discovered by him. The book could have been made shorter and better if Wilder had not too frequently indulged in too lengthy discussion of his pet subjects.

As to lack of information let us say that not only does Wilder not mention Broca's now old, but still classical, memoir on the Primates, but that he also ignores Sontag, Kohler, Volz, Martin and others. Duckworth is rarely quoted, although his works on the subject are among the very best, and the same is true of Boule whose description of the brain of the La Chapelle-aux-Saints man is a masterpiece. In general, and as is frequently the case with works published in America, German anthropological literature is given a prominent place by Wilder, although he forgot Volz, Kolher and Martin. The French one, that is more

important on the subject of fossil man simply because a very large part of the best specimens have been found on French soil, is given less attention. When a French work is quoted it is generally an old one like de Lapparent's geology from which Wilder copied a worn-out classification of geological formations (p. 84). The classification of hair types given on page 317 is taken from Deniker without indication of the source. Before writing on fossil man Wilder might have gone through the thirty-five big volumes of L'Anthropologie, and through the many volumes of our leading German anthropological journals, but what is more astonishing, is that our author seems to ignore the existence of the only journal devoted to the study of the problems he is apparently interested in, namely, the Giornale per la Morfologia dell'Uomo e dei Primati, in which several remarkable articles have been recently published, or else he would have mentioned it.

Besides the mistakes that can be found in any kind of book, like Yacinde instead of Yaunde, which is taken literally from another mistaken author; Vigo instead of Vero (Florida), page 164; Tarascon, instead of Tarascos, page 358; "abri sur roche" instead of "abri sous roche", page 158; Pygmacus, instead of pygmaus, pages 189, 190 and 204; and many others that could have been more or less easily avoided, there are more serious ones. Wilder has a rather strange conception of what granites are (p. 81). Pithecanthropus erectus, which was probably not erectus at all cannot be the missing link notwithstanding Wilder's rather obsolete opinion about it (pp. 137, 158). The whole paragraph about the supposed anthropoid found in Nebraska (p. 156) shows that the author has not read recent publications on the subject. Where did Wilder find that the Aurignacian belongs to the Middle Paleolithic (p. 157)? Why is his discussion of the Siwalki anthropoids so short and so weak when they are our best source of information of fossil apes (p. 135)? Why is there nothing in his book on the pathology of the primates? The peculiar type of hair found in negroid races is nothing fundamental but something acquired relatively recently, geologically speaking, since we know now the negro foetus has straight hair, but the author overlooked this fact Wilder's treatment of stature is poor since he leaves out the most important point, namely, brachyskely and macroskely, and he leaves it out probably because he has read Manouvrier's memoir on the subject. It is unscientific to say as Wilder does, that North Africa has always been inhabited by the white man because nobody can prove it, and also because it is quite possible that there was a negroid element in the Capsian culture. That Wilder should divide the Aryans (Alpines) into Kelts, Germans, and Slavs, means at least one thing and it is that anthropological terms have quite an elastic meaning (p. 359). The Niam Niams have nothing to do with the Fans notwithstanding the author's opinion (p. 360). Why so much importance is given to the now justly forgotten facial angle is again something that I cannot understand (p. 203).

In conclusion I would say that any anthropologist can learn something of value through reading *The Pedigree of the Human Race*, but I think that it would be dangerous to put it in unexperienced hands.

GEORGE C. ENGERRAND.

Mavor, James. Niagara in Politics. (New York: E. P. Dutton & Co., 1925, pp. vi, 255.)

Ritter, A. H. Transportation Economics of the Great Lakes—St. Lawrence Ship Channel. (Washington: Great Lakes-St. Lawrence Tidewater Association, 1925, pp. 276.)

The first of these two books is a hopelessly biased attack upon the Ontario Hydro-Electric Power Commission, its ex-chairman, the late Sir Adam Beck, and on all that occurred during the eighteen years of his administration. "The fact is indisputable," says Professor Mavor "that because of its policy the Hydro-Electric Power Commission of Ontario has from the beginning of its history been a menace to the financial credit and to the liberties of the people of the Province. The chairman of the Hydro-Electric has for the past twenty years been the dictator of Ontario" (p. 8). Nor was it a mild dictatorship. Professor Mayor describes it as a "reign of terror" (p. 10) in which no auditor, engineer, or newspaper dared speak out in criticism. It may all be true; but if the situation be as he paints it, how explain the fact that a project to erect a hospital to the memory of Sir Adam has received the warmest support from people in all levels of society and the fact that a move is now on foot to have a special book prepared for use in the public schools to glorify his name and deeds. The latter endeavor has gone to such lengths that it has been dubbed by those less devout in the cause of public ownership as "the canonization of Saint Adam á Becket." Where does the truth lie? It is a question of immediate practical importance. Ontario Hydro-Electric is being held up as a shining example to all America and the comparison of the rates charged there with those of companies selling power in this country is very much in favor of the publicly owned system. Lest one such evil should corrupt the world the National Electric Light Association has lately been devoting an increasing share of its energies to the dissemination of the "truth" about Hydro. This book has been scattered far and wide by them. One cannot blame them. They may be quite sincere. In any case, the private exploitation of an essentially monopolistic industry can let drop various plums into pockets well able to receive them. One would only suggest, however, that moderation has its uses and its value. Something more than vehemence is needed to carry conviction, and a statement like the present one is more likely to irritate than to convince. There is also the further fact that this experiment in public ownership may have its lessons for the professional economist. It has usually been agreed that public ownership could only succeed in an established and stable industry. Under dynamic conditions the public body would inevitably fall far to the rear in the march of technical progress. Even in the stable industries, the publicly operated enterprises would lag behind and sponge on the private companies which had pioneered in the development of new machinery and methods. "Hydro" had done none of these things. It began as a wholesale distributing system in 1906 when long distance transmission of electric power was just beginning to get under way. Today it has a capital investment of a quarter of a billion dollars. The Queenston-Chippaua development is one of the most advanced works of

its kind in the world and is now developing 550,000 h.p. under one roof. Charges are low, the system is solvent and rapidly expanding, and the support of "Hydro" is one of the cardinal tenets of all parties in the Province. How is all this to be explained?

It has been quite important that the Canadian public has no fear of public ownership; indeed, quite the reverse. It is also worth noting that the technical staff has been of very high efficiency. But the great fact until a year ago has been the personality of the chairman of the Commission, the late Sir Adam Beck. He had made a competence as a box manufacturer and had taken a rather prominent part in politics before the question of electric power came up. When it did arise he made it peculiarly his own and devoted the rest of his life to the public service. There never was any question of his whole-souled devotion to what he believed to be right, nor of the fact that he gave his services for far less than their commercial worth. He never received more than \$15,000 per year. But he did develop almost Messianic delusions toward the end of the late war. He never had taken any ordinary view of his functions. He was to be the Moses leading his people to the promised land where no private monopoly could oppress them, where they need no longer worry over their dependence upon American fuel supplies. Completely honest himself, he took it that all who opposed him were dishonest servants of selfish interests. Fortunately the government came down upon him after 1920 with two searching investigations which proved beyond all doubt the efficiency of the system, and its complete integrity, and which effectively checked any tendency to outrun statutory powers. The present chairman of the Commission, C. A. Magrath, formerly of the International Joint Waterways Commission, is an engineer by training and has a high reputation as a bold but careful administrator. The system seems to be developing under him into a purely economic organization. The old crusading spirit is gone. There is, indeed, no further need for it. A very recent move has been the signing of a contract for the purchase of 50,000 h.p. from a subsidiary of the International Paper Company operating in Quebec. Prophecy is always dangerous, but if I may be permitted to blaze a trail for the angels I should predict a continuous expansion of the Commission's operations and, if anything, an increase in its efficiency. It is next to impossible to conceive of any attempt to turn it over to a private organization. At present the very idea would not even be taken seriously.

The significance of this is that a public enterprise can get managerial ability of the first water, one able to meet successfully a highly dynamic situation. Incidentally it may be remarked that most of Professor Mavor's complaints are against efforts to meet such situations when explicit statutory authority was lacking. Had such initiative been lacking he might have said more of the inevitable unprogressiveness of public bodies. Not only can such ability be had, but it can be given all necessary freedom to carry out the boldest plans without getting beyond the control of the state. No radically new methods have developed. The chairman of the Commission is really the omnipotent company president, the distinguishing mark of American corporate organization, operating

in a new milieu. The real triumph lies in the fact that he is able to exercise his powers to the full under the new master. It has worked beautifully in the matter of electric power in Ontario. None of the other Provinces have attempted anything of the same kind. The same development is under way on a national scale in the Canadian National Railways. Sir Henry Thornton has succeeded in creating a quite extraordinary esprit de corps among the employes and in getting very real efficiency on the National Railways. But it must always be remembered that the bases of the whole development are by no means wide. Let the supply of highly qualified and public-spirited administrators run short, and dry rot may set in. If the delicate political conventions which restrain criticism to the essential minimum should break, the whole edifice would crumble. One cannot help but feel that the National Electric Light Association might well rest easy. So long as the United States retains so many of the preconceptions of direct democracy their position will be unchallenged. The success of public ownership depends upon peculiar social conditions, conditions not likely to arise in this country for a very long period.

Mr. Ritter's book is also propagandist in intent, but he gives us propaganda of a very high order. He sets out to prove that it is desirable to deepen the St. Lawrence canals to twenty-five feet (with thirty feet on the lock sills so that the added depth may be had at any time by dredging out the intermediate reaches) by joint international action. He assembles statistics of the commodities moving into and out of that part of the United States which would be affected by such a canal and then proceeds to show the possible savings by comparing the current rail rates to and from the seaboard plus the ocean rates beyond with the rail rates to the Lake ports plus a fair rate based on existing ocean rates. The year chosen for the comparison was 1922. As rail rates have since been, and promise to be, comparatively stable while ocean rates have continuously declined, subsequent events have only strengthened his case. The most detailed study is made of the grain trade. There he estimates that the saving in transportation costs alone would amount to \$44,000,000. while the great bulk of the grain which is not exported would naturally be increased in value by the higher export price offered. He estimates that a total of 30,000,000 tons would be available for carriage by this route, one-third export grain, one-third domestic traffic, and one-sixth imports. As the cost of deepening the existing system has been estimated by competent engineers under the International Joint Waterways Commission at \$252,000,000, while the need for power on both sides of the boundary will force the building of the necessary dams in any case, he would seem to have proven his point. Of special value is the chapter in which he disposes of the objections which are currently urged against this project. The book is very amply illustrated by charts, graphs and maps. Mr. Ritter has written a very able brief for one side of the case, one well worthy of the attention of anyone interested in this topic.

JOHN L. McDougall.

University of Texas.

Merriam, Charles E., Four American Party Leaders. (New York: The Macmillan Co., 1926, pp. xvi, 104.)

This volumes contains four lectures discussing Abraham Lincoln, Theodore Roosevelt, Woodrow Wilson and William Jennings Bryan as political leaders, given at Amherst College in May, 1924, upon the Henry Ward Beecher Foundation. A very satisfactory Introduction is supplied which explains the method of study and analysis followed by Professor Merriam, and some titles useful for the study of leadership are given at the end of the book. Four famous party leaders are compared. The national leadership of the first, Lincoln, is seen in the span of some seven years, from 1858 to 1865, reaching from the Douglas debates to the tragedy in Washington. The period of Roosevelt, Wilson and Bryan is taken to extend from 1890 to 1920, the social and economic background of the three being not different, but Wilson was not a part of the political movement until 1910, and both Roosevelt and Wilson were antedated and outlived by Bryan.

The thesis of Professor Merriam is that leadership is one of the basic factors in the organization of life, but that in the higher forms of social and political life too little attention has been given to the relations of dominance and subordination. The author says we cannot hope to manufacture at will our Lincolns, Roosevelts, Wilsons, and Bryans, but optimistically believes that "we may reasonably look forward to a more intelligent view of the whole problem of leadership, to more intelligent training of potential leaders, and to progressively intelligent popular discrimination in the selection and rejection of the personnel of leadership, and in the circumspection of its metes and bounds" (100-101). Thus, in view of the fundamental importance of leadership in any community, and especially in modern democracy, it is of the greatest consequence that studies of the qualities of political leadership be energtically and intelligently prosecuted.

The qualities found in party leaders are analyzed by Mr. Merriam, and then he tests and compares the four men in terms of this analysis. The pronounced characteristics of political leaders are physical strength, unusual sensitiveness to currents of political thought and feeling, acute perception of possible courses of community action, the ability to make personal contacts, facility in dramatic expression, and, finally, courage. Lincoln's outstanding qualities were his basic equipment of a powerful body and mind, with a temperament singularly combining somber melancholy and exurberant humor. Roosevelt with relatively little humility and self-depreciation was aggressive, confident, with few real shadows of uncertainty. Mr. Merriam thinks that Roosevelt was unusually sensitive to the strength and direction of social movements, and "more keenly than any other politician of his time Roosevelt caught the demand for integrity in public life." Given a situation he could see and find a way out, but he was not likely to look a long way ahead for roads to freedom or prosperity. Woodrow Wilson, according to Merriam, is one of the

mysteries of politics, and he wonders that so remarkable a master of political finesse should have remained aloof so long from a world to which he was so preëminently adapted. His leadership is one of the world's great enigmas. And it may be said that the books of his associates have done very little to clear the mystery of Wilson. Mr. Merriam uses Wilson to interpret his theory of necessary physical power in a political leader, and he considers Wilson's greatest weakness his lack of physical stamina for personal contacts. But he understood the democratic movement in America, and strove to realize its ideals in American life. His bitterest foes were those who resented his steady advocacy of

government by the many instead of government by the few.

Perhaps Mr. Merriam's most satisfying study is that of Bryan, his least adequate being that of Lincoln. Bryan, "prophet and priest of millions, although they did not make him their king," assumed the leadership of the anti-evolutionist forces after the lecture was given, but in a footnote the author says that in the controversy may be clearly observed the same traits of leadership that made Mr. Bryan a notable figure in the political field. This may damn him with faint praise; at least it commands democracy to raise the standards of courage for its leaders. There is much value in the statement that what Bryan's enemies could not understand was that the people are as much interested in knowing about their leader's heart as in knowing about his head, and that sympathy no less than intelligence plays its part in the great process of popular control.

It is of course clear in these lectures that Professor Merriam is making an effort to understand political democracy as it is, and leaders as they are. No one is more aware of the difficulty of making accurate comparisons of the leaders of democracy than Mr. Merriam, but his study is one of the worthwhile efforts towards an understanding of the personal element in politics, and in its larger implications the whole problem of leadership in democracy is suggested. Nor does Mr. Merriam fail to see how important it is to compare leaders in other fields: in labor, Gompers; in finance, Morgan; in education, Eliot; in military, Grant, or in the ecclesiastical field, Gibbons. Also that it will be valuable to study the attributes and characteristics of the non-leader, or of the average man, with a view of observing the differential that might appear upon a thorough-going analysis of the essential traits involved. Perhaps now that legislative machinery is being used by "uplift," by skilled advertising reformers and by trained propagandists, it may be well to give a great deal of attention to the politics of Methodist bishops, presidents of state universities, governors, and all those whose business it is to make democracy think it is getting something for nothing.

CHARLES W. PIPKIN.

Louisiana State University.

Horwill, Herbert W., The Usages of the American Constitution. (London: Oxford University Press, 1925, pp. 243.)

Some thirty-six years have elapsed since the publication of Bryce's American Commonwealth. Meanwhile few Englishmen havve essayed a criticism of the American system of government, every opportunity of contributing to the subject seemingly having been already pre-empted. But now another English writer, probably receiving his stimulus mainly

from the works of Lord Bryce, has issued a volume which may be regarded as a distinct addition to the study of American institutions. The book treats of certain phases of our Constitution with a freshness of approach and a knness of analysis which challenge the reader to check up on numerous accepted views respecting our Government.

The author first asks the question, "What is the American Constitution?" Seeking his answer in the broad definitions of Dicey and Cooley, he concludes that it is composed of those rules habitually followed in the exercise of sovereignty. It has, then, all of the elements of the Constitution of England and one more-a special section which is prior to all legislative enactments and is not capable of amendment by the Legislature. There is need of revising our customary terminology. Mr. Horwill suggests that the instrument of 1787 be called the "Fundamental Law of the Constitution" to make room for other vital elements which have grown up meanwhile. Following Dicey's analysis of the English Constitution, that of the United States would be divided into the following parts: I. The Law of the Constitution, comprising (1) The Fundamental Law of the Constitution; (2) The Statute Law of the Constitution; (3) The Common Law of the Constitution. II. The Conventions of the Constitution. To the latter and more neglected phase of the subject the writer now turns in detail.

Doubtless the best example of how custom has found its way into our Constitution is found in the manner of electing the President. The author skillfully reviews the movements which have brought about an entire change in the original election methods, transforming the electors into mere coks in a machine and placing the government in the hands of the major political parties. Another usage which has had far-reaching effect is that which converts the Vice-President into a full President upon the death of, and only upon the death of, the latter. This deprives us of an acting executive when the President is ill or out of the United States, and has led to some very embarrassing situations, as in the lingering illness of Garfield and Wilson and in the latter's journey abroad. In a chapter on third presidential terms. Mr. Horwill follows the conventional method of development, adding that the custom is binding enough to be classed as a part of the Constitution, finding its support in the old Greek fear of the tyrant and in popular unwillingness to honor any other President more than Washington.

The origin and growth of the cabinet as an extra-constitutional organ of government is ably dealt with and its relation to Congress criticized at length. While the author favors more harmonious contacts between the executive and legislative branches of the National Government, he thinks that the introduction of anything like the parliamentary system would be inadvisable. He next discusses the President's powers of appointment and removal and concludes that, in spite of the Warren case, we have reason to believe the President's control of his executive personnel has definitely crystallized into a binding constitutional practice.

The power of the purse is another important matter which is regulated by usage. The House originates appropriation bills but the Senate has wide authority in dealing with revenue measures through expansion of its power to amend. Both have unwisely resorted to "tacking" to compel the President to sign measures which he opposed. The strictly American institution of resident Congressmen is shown to be the outgrowth of a practice which has resulted in making the representative a mere spoils-seeker of his district and in depriving us of the services of able men once they are repudiated by their home constituency. A chapter on miscellaneous usages includes a discussion of those customs which require open meetings of Congress, except the Senate in executive session; which prohibit a person holding State and Federal offices simultaneously; which prevent "diluting" the Supreme Court for political purposes; and which forbid the Government's conferring titles of honor other than those not allowed under the fundamental law.

Usages are constantly changing. Wilson upset one of long standing when he read his message to Congress in person; he overturned another when he left the United States. The validity of conventions depends on their usefulness at the moment, and their strength in developing popular sentiment in their favor. In the concluding chapter, the writer criticizes Bryce's classification of constitutions into "rigid" and "flexible" types on the ground that it does not take into account their fundamental content, or ethos. He says further that mutability is only a matter of degree; and, in fact, the American Constitution is as easily changed as that of England, for the conservative nature of the English people balances any mechanical safeguards which our written instrument may have set up. The belief that our Constitution is difficult to change is wrong, for it includes not only the fundamental law but also statutes, court decisions, and customs, which are readily altered; besides, the fundamental law itself can be amended when a large body of opinion throughout the nation favors it, as is shown by recent experience. And again the written document is subject to continual evasion, preventing it from being the infallible safeguard of democracy which is popularly supposed to be the case. Recognition of these facts should do much to discourage the dangerous habit in this country of trusting all to written constitutions, of being lulled to sleep in the belief that there is no need for that eternal vigilance required of less-favored peoples because our "rights have been enshrined once and for all in a sacrosanct form of words and placed safely beyond the grasp of devouring time."

As the author fully realizes, he has made but a beginning in the study of the American Constitution from this newer angle. His treatment suggests any number of questions about which there will be much difference of opinion. Among such might be mentioned: (1) When is a usage converted from a mere "flexible parasite growing upon a rigid stem" (as Bryce says) into a vital part of the Constitution? (2) Do all the usages enumerated by the writer have such binding force as to be regarded as parts of the Constitution? (3) Should the author have omitted a consideration of the congressional caucus, the committee system, and the speakership on the ground that they were mere matters of procedure, when he included a discussion of revenue measures, appropriation bills, and "tacking"? (4) What are the sanctions of conventions? Are they found in the law of the land (as Dicey reasons), in a code of

honor (as Lowell suggests), in overwhelming popular support (as Horwill declares), or elsewhere? (5) What part do the reserved powers of the states play in the American constitutional system? Can Dicey's analysis of the unitary English Constitution apply equally well to our federal plan? (6) What classification of constitutions should be made in lieu of the discredited classification of Lord Bryce? Perhaps subsequent studies will cover these points and more. We shall await with interest further explorations along the paths blazed by the author.

S. D. MYRES, JR.

Southern Methodist University.

Sullivan, Mark, Our Times: The Turn of the Century, 1900-1904. (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1926, pp. xviii, 610.)

Under this title the author undertakes the difficult task of writing recent history. In this volume, presumably the first of several covering the period from 1900 to 1925, he embarks upon a description, rather than a narrative account, of the United States in "the turn of the century, 1900-1904."

The difficulty of his undertaking rests lightly upon him, for his conception of history and method of depicting it are strikingly similar to the views of Dr. Dooley whom he cites on the subject as follows:

I know histry isn't thrue, Hinnissy, because it ain't like what I see ivry day in Halsted Sthreet. If any wan comes along with a histhry iv Greece or Rome that'll show me th' people fightin', gettin' dhrunk, makin' love, gettin' married, owin' th' groceryman an' bein' without hard coal, I'll believe they was a Greece or Rome, but not befure. Historyans is like doctors. They are always lookin' f'r symptoms. Those iv them that writes about their own times examines th' tongue an' feels th' pulse an' makes a wrong diagnosis. T'h other kind iv histhry is a post-mortem examination. It tells ye what a counthry died iv. But I'd like to know what it lived iv."

In which connection one feels inclined to accuse the writer of making no diagnosis at all.

The book's title is somewhat misleading. More than half of its 600 pages are devoted to the closing decade of the nineteenth century, while the years 1901, 1902, 1903 receive but one chapter each, while 1904 is ignored entirely save by indirection. The last 100 pages, indeed, are little more than a calendar of events.

The volume is excellently illustrated and contains a surprising and varied wealth of incident and detail. It sets forth in a style not unattractive the politics and popular songs, the cartoons and clothes, the medicine and music, the science and sentiments, together with many other aspects of the American folkways and mores of twenty-five years ago. The author's wide newspaper experience and contacts have well qualified him to write such a description of the period.

No account of the United States can afford to neglect the expansion of the nation's foreign policy, particularly in the Carribean area, during the period covered by the author. He gives, it is true, an interesting

account of Dewey in the Philippines and later in politics, of Cuban and Canal Zone sanitation, and of the Supreme Court's verdict in the "Insular Cases"; but such important topics as the significance of the Hay-Pauncefote Treaty, Germany's testing out of the Monroe Doctrine in 1902, the real manner in which the Canal Zone was acquired and the extension of the Monroe Doctrine in 1904 are utterly ignored.

Viewed from the historian's standpoint, the book, though for the most part quite readable, smacks somewhat of a scrap book or a social-economic-political potpourri. There is lack of continuity, of selection of the significant, of evaluation, and of definite conclusions as to whither the facts and incidents described may point.

S. R. GAMMON, JR.

The A. and M. College of Texas.

Stephenson, George M., A History of American Immigration. (Boston: Ginn & Co., 1926, pp. vi, 316.)

It is manifestly impossible for a history to describe all the events connected with the subject or the period with which it deals. The author is forced to select from the great mass of facts those few which he deems most significant and to discard the rest. The making of such a selection is not easy, even when the historian steps carefully into the footprints of his predecessors, but it is infinitely more difficult when he undertakes to present a new set of facts and to bring out an aspect of his subject customarily neglected by historians and, hence, unfamiliar to the general reader.

Under these circumstances it becomes his first task to present such material as will most clearly mark out the new field. He cannot content himself with critical comment on the assumption that the main facts in the case are already well known. He must, moreover, show that the new field is deserving of the attention he is giving it, that its importance is greater than its long-suffered obscurity would indicate.

These difficulties are well met and ably overcome in Professor George M. Stephenson's book, A History of American Immigration. The author has herein turned to the reader's view a hitherto unnoticed aspect of the immigrant's life, namely, the part played by the immigrant in American politics. Beginning with the sporadic movements which led to the know-nothingism of pre-Civil War days, Dr. Stephenson shows the interplay of conflicting interests which, now favoring immigration and now opposing it, culminates in the recent organized antagonism to immigration as exemplified by the Ku Klux Klan and the American Legion. The importance of economic factors in the process is clearly indicated. The author presents them, first, as the chief reason why the foreigners forsook their native lands for America and, subsequently, as the dominant motive of those who have tried, through the agency of politics, to promote or restrict immigration.

The steady, onward march of restrictive legislation, beginning with slight local regulations and ending with the quota law of 1924 shows the gradual changing attitude of Americans toward the immigrant. We have become less and less friendly toward the foreigner; our prejudices

have grown strong; our regulations have become more stringent, until now we are contemplating the adoption of laws which will stop immigration altogether. Insofar as attitudes reflect underlying conditions, these changes may indicate that man-power as a factor in the exploitation of American resources and in the carrying on of American industrial enterprises has reached the point of diminishing returns.

Dr. Stephenson's characterizations of the various nationalities of which the immigration has been composed are both enlightening and interesting. The reader may, perhaps, wonder a little at the disproportionately large place given to the Scandinavians. They are ordinarily relegated to a short paragraph in the chapter on "other nationalities," and, if numbers be accepted as the basis for evaluation, such relegation is not unjust. Dr. Stephenson is either rightly convinced that their importance is greater than their relative numbers or he has allowed himself to be influenced by the fact that he wrote the book in a city which may be considered the stronghold of Scandinavians in America.

But the criticism is trifling. If the author has erred a little in the placing of emphasis here, he has more than vindicated himself by his firm refusal to enter into the controversy regarding racial superiority. With genuine scientific caution he declines to accept the meagre data now available as the basis for sound judgments. When one recalls the temptation that urges every writer to cast his vote one way or the other on a question which recurs every time an immigration bill is launched, the author's reserve appears truly admirable. He limits himself to merely suggesting that conditions in America have changed and leaves the reader to infer the possibility that it is these changed conditions, rather than inherent racial differences, which are responsible for our attitudes toward the new immigration. But this is in anticipation; the conclusion must await the accumulation of the facts.

With respect to the book as a whole it is not too high praise to say that it is an exceptionally readable account, sympathetically presented, which by its unique emphasis brings out a phase of the foreigner's life of which we are glad to know. It is, therefore, a valuable addition to the small number of good books on the subject of American immigration.

CARL M. ROSENGUIST.

University of Texas.

Schevill, Ferdinand, History of Modern Europe. (New York: Harcourt Brace & Co., 1925, pp. 728.)

In evaluating a history textbook, one must take into consideration its historical accuracy, literary style, arrangement of subject matter, interpretation of historical events and characters, distribution of emphasis, and illustrative material. On these various points Professor Shevill's book takes very high rank, especially on the first four.

The book gives excellent evidence of the author's growth in the field he has developed. More than twenty-five years ago, while yet a young instructor in history in the University of Chicago, he essayed his first textbook in modern European history. Except for the chapters on the Reformation and the Counter Reformation, this book conformed strictly to the Freemanic definition and conception of history. The author was not lacking in interest in other phases of history, for he was giving at the time some very popular courses in the Renaissance. But that was before the day of the "New History," and hence when he undertook to write a textbook for college students, he left out of consideration practically all other phases of life than the political.

In his new book, however, Professor Schevill has made ample amends for his past historical shortcomings. But he has undertaken to do more than give in outline the bare facts in the various phases of life in modern Europe. He offers an interpretation of those facts and sets forth their historical significance and meaning. His book is therefore a close approach to a history of modern civilization, or, as he has put it, "a portal to such a history." It does not presume too much, however, on the knowledge of the immature college student for whom it is intended. It gives a sufficient background of facts to make the author's interpretation intelligible and stimulating.

The chapters on the social or cultural phases of history are especially noteworthy. Instead of being mere compilations of encyclopedic facts on art, literature, science, religion, customs and the like, the chapters on these phases have too often been in other textbooks, they show, for example, how the lives of men have been affected by the new forms of art and literature, new religious movements, new inventions, and new discoveries in science.

It would seem ungracious to criticize so excellent a book adversely, but one wonders why twenty pages were devoted to the Revolt of the Netherlands and only forty pages to the World War, including the conditions and events leading up to that conflict. Interesting and important as the first subject is, it appears to have been somewhat overemphasized, judging from the amount of space given to the other vastly more important topic. Exception may also be taken to some of the sketch maps. Those on page 76 on the unification of France and Spain and the one on page 551 on the unification of Italy are without any explanation whatsoever and hence are not likely to be very helpful to the uninformed reader. The new map of Europe for 1925 on page 692 ought to have been in color in order to coördinate it with those representing earlier periods.

E. M. VIOLETTE.

Louisiana State University.

Lay, Tracy Hollingsworth, The Foreign Service of the United States. (New York: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1925, p. x, 438.)

The title of this publication rather accurately fits its contents. Foreign service is construed to include the diplomatic and consular services and those of other executive departments such as labor and commerce whose activities are closely related to and sometimes seriously affect those of the more truly political agencies of our Government in the field of foreign affairs. It is clearly and correctly pointed out that no definite line of demarcation can be drawn between the political and commercial activities of our Government and that all of the executive departments that

participate in these services should have a common policy. It has been too frequently the case that these departments have not only had contradictory policies, but have duplicated each other's services. The author believes that the reorganized foreign service under the Act of May 24, 1924, will corrct these defects of the old service.

The reorganized foreign service is described in considerable detail, with emphasis on personnel, retirement system, education for foreign service, and homes for diplomats. It is further pointed out that adequate provision for our foreign service has not yet been made. The great stake that our nation has in agriculture, commerce, and finance just as imperatively calls for experts in these fields as the so-called political policy of the Government requires trained diplomats.

The value of this publication rests mainly upon two points: (1) It is comprehensive yet brief—multum in parvo—and (2) Its point of view is that of the foreign civil servant who has participated in the actual workings of the old order, and who, therefore, is in a position to speak, after having fortified himself by consulting a rather extensive amount of source material. Yet these valuable features of the book subjected the author to certain tests which were not fully met. It partakes of the character of a report of a field officer. Its style is choppy. Further elaboration and polish are necessary to make 't a finished product. It is, therefore, not a textbook or a book that we old attract the general reader. A considerable amount of its material, however, should be particularly valuable to the American business man. Its bibliographies and appendices contain useful information for the student of our foreign service.

C. P. PATTERSON.

University of Texas.

Smith, Bruce, The State Police. (New York: Macmillan Co., 1925, pp. 28.)

This book is a study of the police forces of eleven states, and of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police. It is based upon statutes, written reports, and personal observation.

The author has followed a logical order in the arrangement of his material, beginning with the problem of rural police protection which he discusses in the first chapter, and following with chapters on Functions, Organization, Direction and Control of Personnel, Compensation and Wages, the Patrol Force, and Special Services.

The introduction of rapid means of communication has brought the city closer to the country, and has, so to speak, made crime cosmopolitan. In reporting upon criminal depredations against banks in 1923, the American Bankers Association reports that "ninety per cent of these daylight robberies occurred in suburban or rural districts, where police protection is largely in the hands of constables and sheriffs." The author has shown by his research that the local peace officers have been unable to match wits and speed with the present day highwayman.

There is the militia which may be called out in extraordinary emergencies, but this arm of the law enforcing agency has, as the author points out, serious disadvantages. First the expense and delay attendant

upon mobilization, and second that the militiaman is an amateur soldier and uses either too little or too much force. Private industrial police forces have been employed by companies who sought protection during industrial disputes. The disadvantages attaching to this method of police protection are apparent. The conclusion of the Anthracite Coal Strike Commission of 1902 was that "peace and order should be maintained at any cost, but should be maintained at the expense of the public by regularly appointed and responsible officers." This view was recognized in Pennsylvania by the act which established the Pennsylvania State Police, a body intended "as far as possible, to take the place of the police now appointed at the request of various corporations."

The state police, therefore, exists as an extension of state control over police administration, and as an attempt to meet the new conditions. Their duties ordinarily are concerned with the rural districts, but there has been no hesitation in sending them within the boundaries of municipalities when conditions exist that require, in the opinion of the governor,

their presence for the proper enforcement of the state's laws.

It may be stated in conclusion that the author does not attempt to pass upon the efficiency of state police forces as law enforcing agencies. The volume lacks acute analysis, but the general purpose of presenting the practical organization, functions, and some of the major problems of the state police forces has been very well done. The value of the book is enhanced by several maps and charts. It deals with an interesting phase of the state's work, and is a valuable addition to the workshop of the teacher and student of American State Government.

J. E. PATE.

University of Texas.

Hamilton, Walton H., Current Economic Problems. (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1925. Third Edition, pp. 960.)

Professor Hamilton has revised his book of readings on Current Economic Problems in order to include some material bearing more directly upon present-day problems and to replace "some readings, of great interest six years ago [concerning war] with others which are of more lasting significance."

The chief change from the previous edition comes in the deletion of some fifty pages on "The Problem of Economic Organization for War," thus making room for valuable additions to the other sections.

The section on Problems of the Business Cycle has been improved by eleven readings on typical theories of crises, and Business Judgment and the Cycle. Similarly, the section on Railway Regulation has additional reading on consolidation, the motor truck, etc., suggested by recent developments. The section on Population includes a resumé of the Immigration Acts of 1921 and 1924. The discussion of Trades Unionism has been enlarged and improved, and readings on the inheritance tax and the single tax have been added to the section on Taxation.

A comparison of the book in its present form with former editions shows that its value as reference material has been sufficiently enhanced to warrant the new edition. The best of the old has been retained, and

numerous subjects of contemporary interest added. It reduces to compact and readily accessible form material valuable in furnishing a perspective of economic problems. Rightly employed, it should be of real value to both instructors and students.

JOHN I. MOSHER.

University of Texas.

An interesting combination of the case and textbook methods is to be found in Professor Charles E. Martin's Introduction to the Study of the American Constitution. (Oxford Press, American Branch, 1926.) The book is divided into three parts, dealing with the formation, development and spirit of the American Constitution. The method of treatment is necessarily a very condensed one because of the extensive character of the subject matter. Especially is this true of the first part where within ninety pages there are eighteen chapters treating of the colonial, revolutionary and constitution making periods. In fact much of this portion is hardly more than an outline or syllabus of the subjects under discussion. The second part consists of brief introductions to leading cases, and of summaries of those cases with occasional quotations from the opinions of the court. The decisions covered include nearly all of the important ones from the time of Marshall to the present. In Part III the method of textual summary and commentary is followed and the subject matter includes studies of fundamental legal rights, principles and ideals of American constitutional government and American international ideals. There is a valuable appendix containing many of the most important documents in American constitutional history, from the Mayflower compact to some selections from the Federalist, and also brief bibliographical notes on the members of the Convention of 1787, lists of Supreme Court's justices, and of acts and decisions involving the use of the court's power to declare congressional acts invalid. There are extensive bibliographical aids and a useful index.

Professor Charles W. Gersternberg's Constitutional Law (Prentice-Hall, 1926) proceeds upon the plan of preceding the selections from cases by a short text which is a brief outline of essential information rather than a commentary upon decisions. It contains short chapters on such standard topics as the development and amendment of the Constitution, departments of government, interstate relations, taxation and money and banking, and others on the more definitely legal problems of obligation of contracts, due process, equal protection and the police power. This portion of the book (126 pages), is heavily annotated with references to constitutional opinions. The remainder of the work (just over 400 pages) contains selections from fifty-eight cases. Of these nearly half date back no farther than 1920. The old landmarks have not been neglected but special emphasis is placed upon such contemporary constitutional problems as seizure under the prohibition act, the rent law cases, punishment of a lawyer for written contempt and the power to pardon, English speech in school laws and regulation of trading in grain futures. The book should therefore be of distinct value to the teacher and student of present day constitutional law.

Charles Grove Haines and Bertha Moser Haines have recently revised their Principles and Problems of Government (Harper, pp. xvii, 663). In the revision the authors have not only brought up to date the material in the first edition, but have also added such new material as experience and later developments have justified. The general arrangement of parts and chapters remains the same. The most important addition is a chapter on state constitutions and one on problems of international organization and administration. Other valuable additions, incorporated in old chapters, deal with judicial supremacy and legislative and administrative decentralization. Particular attention should be called to the discussion of "Judicial Supremacy by Implication" in the United States, Canada, Australia, Brazil, Argentina, and Mexico (pp. 258-261). All changes and additions are characterized by the same scholarly treatment that distinguishes the first edition. The already large field of usefulness of Principles and Problems of Government has without doubt been extended by this revision.

C. T.